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Each country in the world is currently under pressure to find other means than fossil fuels to satisfy 
its energy needs, as the legally binding Paris Agreement urges to limit global warming to 2 degrees 
Celsius. Denmark and Finland were part of the Kyoto Protocol, and as part of the EU, agreed earlier 
on targets on their emissions, energy efficiency, and renewable energy. Although these countries were 
at the forefront to combat climate change, they are still far away to complete the transition of their 
energy systems. 
 
This thesis analyses Danish and Finnish national energy and climate strategies. The study asks how 
will Denmark and Finland ensure their security of energy supply as energy and climate targets 
necessitate to replace all fossil fuels until 2050. It applies a social structurationist approach to develop 
a theoretical framework to answer the question of why have these countries chosen exactly the means 
they are currently employing. 
 
Through comparative case study approach this study shows that there are both major similarities and 
differences in Danish and Finnish energy strategies. Both countries expand the production of bio-
based energy sources, and strive to reduce energy consumption through energy efficiency measures. 
However, Denmark considers wind power a financially viable energy source and crucial for its future 
energy mix, whereas Finland views it as a complimentary alternative. Finland relies on nuclear energy 
for the foreseeable future, in contrast to Denmark which gives the technology no part in its energy 
planning. This divergence highlights how the EU in general is divided in regard to nuclear power. 
 
This thesis finds Denmark more ambitious than Finland in light of energy and climate targets. Finland 
deems further technological development, especially the commercialisation of carbon capture and 
storage, necessary to reach the long-term targets.  
 Contents 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. The research question and initial hypothesis ......................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Central concept: security of supply ........................................................................................................ 2 
1.3. Why does energy matter? ...................................................................................................................... 4 
1.4. International climate agreement – at last .............................................................................................. 9 
1.5. Energy policy of the EU ......................................................................................................................... 10 
1.6. Why Denmark and Finland? ................................................................................................................. 14 
1.7. Structure of the thesis .......................................................................................................................... 19 
2. Contemporary theoretical models and framework for the study ........................................................ 21 
2.1. Established approaches ........................................................................................................................ 21 
2.1.1. Energy diplomacy .......................................................................................................................... 22 
2.1.2 Geopolitics and energy security ..................................................................................................... 23 
2.1.3. Energy economics and trade ......................................................................................................... 25 
2.1.4. Energy and the environment ......................................................................................................... 26 
2.1.5. Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 28 
2.2. Social structuration and energy policy formation ................................................................................ 29 
2.3. Susan Strange: four structures of power .............................................................................................. 32 
2.4. Aalto et al.: frames and dimensions ..................................................................................................... 37 
2.5. Forming the analytical model for the study ......................................................................................... 41 
3. Methodology: A comparative case study approach............................................................................ 47 
3.1. The role of method in the research setting .......................................................................................... 47 
3.2. Comparative case study ....................................................................................................................... 49 
4. Analysis............................................................................................................................................ 54 
4.1. The material .......................................................................................................................................... 54 
4.2. Denmark – fossil fuel independency by 2050 ...................................................................................... 55 
4.2.1. How? From expansion of wind power to energy efficiency .......................................................... 55 
4.2.2. Why? To promote domestic cleantech expertise and to take the lead ........................................ 60 
4.3. Finland – further technological advances needed ............................................................................... 64 
4.3.1. How? Sufficient domestic capacity from forest-based biomass and nuclear power .................... 64 
4.3.2. Why? Dependency on nuclear power, biomass, and CCS technology .......................................... 68 
5. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 73 
Sources ................................................................................................................................................ 81 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The research question and initial hypothesis 
The research question for this study concerns how Denmark and Finland are pursuing the security of 
energy supply in their national energy and climate strategies for the short-, medium-, and long-term 
in the period from 2020 to 2050? How do they approach this issue similarly or differently in relation 
to each other? Both countries have set ambitious energy and climate targets within the EU and on 
their own behalf, which strongly advocate finding other means to satisfy their energy needs than 
burning fossil fuels. At the same time, EU member states must ensure that the energy available is 
affordable so that their industries and companies’ competitiveness, and their households’ purchasing 
power, doesn’t suffer. It is by no means a simple task to fit progressive climate targets and such a 
vital factor for a modern society as a secure energy supply together.1 Yet succeeding in it is crucial 
for societies and the environment. The actions of the 21st century states are of central role, and 
therefore I find this research question justified. 
 
Based on the binding energy and climate targets which alone direct EU countries’ energy policy 
decision-making,2 my initial hypothesis purposes Denmark and Finland are, at least in part, pursuing 
security of supply through similar means. These could include stronger utilisation of biomass for 
energy and heat production; increased efforts to grow non-food crops and reuse agricultural waste 
and woodchips for biofuel and biogas production; further initiatives to cut energy consumption by 
setting increasingly stricter energy efficiency standards for vehicles and devices; advocacy for 
measures to increase the CO2 allowance price within the ETS; and by automating and digitalising the 
electrical grid (smart grid technologies) which allows two-way communication between the utility 
and customer (i.e. small-scale energy producers can sell their excess electricity to the operator), and 
enables the grid to respond to quickly changing electricity demand. 
 
However, I anticipate there will be notable differences between Denmark and Finland in relation to 
their attempts to guarantee security of energy supply. Presumably wind power is given a much more 
significant role in Danish strategies than in Finnish ones. In 2014, the installed wind capacity in 
                                                 
1 Even without considering energy and climate targets, security of supply hasn’t evolved for the better in the Nordic 
countries in last decades. One example is that between 1992 and 2002 electricity consumption increased by 17% in the 
Nordic countries whereas production capacity grew only by 2% (Ruostetsaari 2010, 92). 
2 Some earlier works close to the subject of this study which have guided me include, for instance, Birchfield and Duffield 
2011, Goldthau 2013, Morata and Solorio 2012, and Proedrou 2012. 
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Denmark equalled 5,030 MW, while in Finland the parallel number was 1,005 MW.3 4 Moreover, the 
countries – most likely – differ in regard to nuclear energy. It accounts for around 18% of Finland’s 
total energy consumption whereas in Denmark it has no part in energy planning, a situation which 
will likely remain the same.5 6 Presumably nuclear energy continues to be part of Finnish energy mix, 
maybe even more so in the future than today. 
 
My argument is that both the similarities and differences between Danish and Finnish energy and 
climate strategies, regarding security of supply, can at least partially be explained by the respective 
EU member states’ assessments of surrounding policy environments (of which more in the theory 
section below). Basically, I argue, it comes down to questions of resource sufficiency, the price of 
different energy sources, the role of other actors of energy policy, the environmental effects of 
different forms of energy production and consumption, and how much leeway the technology 
available allows for energy policy. Additionally, it must be noted that even when the surrounding 
policy environments are exactly the same for the states in question, as in this case with technology, 
the countries’ interpretations of it might well be different. 
 
Furthermore, I expect that security of supply is a more central theme in the short- and medium-term 
for Finland than it is for Denmark. This is due to the fact that Denmark was a net-exporter of energy 
until 2012 and its degree of self-sufficiency for energy was 90% in 2014,7 a rare case in the EU, 
whereas in Finland the degree of self-sufficiency was 35% on average in 2010–2013 (53% if nuclear 
power is counted as domestic energy, which is hardly the case in Finland because all the uranium is 
bought, converted, and enriched abroad).8 But in the long-term both countries have agreed to (almost) 
entirely phase out the use of fossil fuels for energy production and transport, which calls for 
significant measures to ensure that security of energy supply can be covered by renewable energy 
sources. 
1.2. Central concept: security of supply 
Having now laid out the research question and the initial hypothesis, a clarification about the central 
concept for this study, namely security of supply, is needed. While security of energy supply may 
                                                 
3 Danish Energy Agency 2015. 
4 Finnish Windpower Association 2016. 
5 Statistics Finland 2015. 
6 World Nuclear Association 2016. 
7 Danish Energy Agency 2015. 
8 World Nuclear Association 2015. 
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seem self-evident initially (e.g. the International Energy Agency (IEA) defines it as the uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price), it may mean different things for different actors.9 
To start, one must note that security of supply and security of demand are the two sides of the same 
coin. Where energy consumers, let them be countries, companies or households, seek to ensure that 
sufficient amount of electricity, fuel and heat are always available, the energy producers pursue 
certainty that their products will be purchased.10 One common way to protect domestic or renewable 
energy producers is to subsidise them so that the state in question can reduce dependency on imports 
of fossil fuels. Another example of how supply and demand security are closely connected can be 
found, for instance, in the gas sector. Russia is the most important gas supplier of the EU, and as the 
EU is dependent on Russian gas, the most prominent Russian supplier, Gazprom, tries to lock up the 
demand through the construction of direct Russia–EU pipelines. This would reduce the impact of 
disputes with third-parties, such as Ukraine, and therefore Russian gas could be delivered to Europe 
with fewer interruptions, increasing both the security of supply and demand.11 
 
In the context of this study, the concerns over the security of demand are not fully relevant. As 
previously noted, Finnish self-sufficiency of energy was 35% in 2010–2013 and in 2011 about half 
of its total primary energy supply consisted of fossil fuels.12 13 Although Denmark was a net-exporter 
of energy until 2012, 85% of its energy production in 2010 was covered by oil and gas. The production 
of both of these fuels peaked already in the last decade, and the state is dedicated to phasing out their 
use in energy production completely by 2050.14 Hence, the market opportunities for (domestic) 
renewable energy producers are plentiful in both countries for the foreseeable future. At state level, 
Finland and Denmark are nowhere near having the amount of renewable energy production capacity 
that would put them, now or in the near future, in some kind of category of ‘Renewable Energy 
Exporting Countries’ whose members would have to be concerned about the sufficiency of demand 
for their products. Therefore, it seems justified to concentrate on the consumer side of energy security, 
i.e. security of supply. 
 
Understanding the whole concept of security of supply may vary from country to country depending 
on their respective energy policy environments. Some EU countries are heavily dependent on Russian 
                                                 
9 IEA 2014b, 13. 
10 See for instance OPEC 2006. 
11 Proedrou 2012, 77–84. 
12 Finnish Government 2014, 23. 
13 IEA 2013a, 15. 
14 IEA 2011a, 15–21. 
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gas alone, and this is reflected in the EU level documents. In some occasions, the term is used 
regarding the gas sector only.15 In this context, security of supply is understood as increasing the 
share of energy imported to Europe from other countries at the expense of the state who currently has 
the dominant position in the market, namely Russia, and more efficient use of energy produced within 
the EU.16 This is close to the IEA terminology for short-term energy security, which is defined as 
“the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes within the supply-demand 
balance”.17  
 
Undoubtedly, this dimension of energy security is crucial and will likely impact Finnish and Danish 
energy and climate strategies, but it does not indicate how the states are going to reformulate their 
energy mixes in the decades to come. Short-term energy security only directs the states to have 
sufficient reserves of energy and possibilities to substitute one energy source or supplier to another. 
For the purpose of this research, a long-term understanding of security of energy supply is necessary. 
To use the IEA terminology, such definition mainly deals with ‘timely investments to supply energy 
in line with economic developments and sustainable environmental needs’.18 At first glance on the 
Finnish and Danish energy and climate strategies, this understanding seems to be shared with the 
countries.19 20 Security of supply is but one cornerstone of the energy trinity the EU countries are 
committed to. It comes at a price, but the countries try to reduce the cost as much as possible but 
sustainably. It must be kept in mind that both Finland and Denmark are dedicated to reducing their 
use of fossil fuels in energy production almost to nil. How exactly are Finland and Denmark going to 
do it without compromising their security of energy supply, and why this avenue and not in some 
other way, is the central question of this study.  
 
To summarise, I define security of supply in this study as uninterrupted and sufficient availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price in line with climate and other environmental commitments. 
1.3. Why does energy matter? 
Energy lies at the very heart of every society. For long economic development and demand for energy 
were coupled, meaning that the more society evolved, the more substantial the role of energy became, 
                                                 
15 European Commission 2015a. 
16 European Commission 2015b. 
17 IEA 2014b, 13. 
18 Ibid. 
19 E.g. Danish Government 2011b, 20; 30. Danish Government 2013, 35. 
20 E.g. Finnish Government 2014, 10; 15–16; 33. 
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and specifically secure access to sufficient energy resources.21 Even the Domesday Book, the oldest 
register of people and regions compiled by the order of William the Conqueror in the eleventh century 
England, recognised the vitality of energy for agricultural production by carefully recording the 
number of the main draught animal, oxen, in every village.22 While energy and all the issues related 
to it have received increasing attention among policymakers, financial institutions, the public, and in 
the media – though still surprisingly little in academia – at least since the first oil crisis in the 1970s, 
the full importance of energy is yet to be wholly appreciated. Susan Strange, an international political 
economy scholar who practically set the research agenda for energy within her field, has purported 
that classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo should have included energy, and 
with it technology too, as factors of production. She argues it was already evident in their time that 
the increasing production of wealth depended on energy and technology, in addition to land, labour, 
and capital.23 Only quite recently have technological developments made it possible to extend 
economic production while consuming the same amount of, or even less, energy than before. To 
illustrate this one can look at two measurements, gross domestic product (GDP) and energy intensity, 
which means total energy consumption per unit of GDP. From 2000 to 2014, the average annual 
global economic growth was 2.7%,24 whereas average annual global energy intensity reduction was 
-1.4%25, indicating falling costs of converting energy into GDP.26 27 However, some economists 
remain doubtful whether it is possible to significantly reduce the number of energy units used for 
economic activities. They claim that the world has merely shifted to other, higher quality, forms of 
energy.28 Nevertheless, the necessity to fulfil energy needs securely and with less carbon dioxide 
(CO2) is ever more important and calls for measures such as increasing energy efficiency and 
switching from fossil fuels to ‘greener’ sources of energy. 
 
How exactly did secure supply of energy become as indispensable as it is for us now? Arguably, there 
are three phases which have each alleviated the value of energy in the world. Industrialisation and the 
increased mobility of people mark the first phase which made the modern society much more 
dependent on energy than its predecessor, the agrarian society.  Production of coal and the Industrial 
Revolution are strongly linked, although the former was already growing before the latter began in 
                                                 
21 Washington Post 2014. 
22 Strange 1988, 186–187. 
23 Ibid., 186. 
24 In constant 2005 US dollars. 
25 In constant 2005 US$. 
26 World Bank 2016a. 
27 Enerdata 2016. 
28 Sorrell and Ockwell 2010. 
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the 1760s. Coal was the very fuel of industrialisation, but traditional energy sources such as wood 
remained more important for long. In the United States, it was only in 1885 when coal became the 
primary source of energy.29 It remained so everywhere in the industrialised countries even after the 
Second World War. At that time coal was cheap, much more efficient than wood, and plentiful. As it 
happens, the latter remains true and at the current rate of use, the known coal stocks are predicted to 
last for more than another century.30 Finally, during the 1950s oil replaced coal as the world’s primary 
energy supply. World War II heralded a new age of mass production of aircraft, ships, and other 
motor vehicles which required substantial increase in oil production. After the war, the oil industry 
grew more productive and could provide (nearly) all the petrol, diesel, and kerosene the societies, 
which were becoming much more mobile than before, needed for cars and airplanes.31 32 Today, 
mankind uses about 85 million barrels of oil per day. An average human has to work 10 hours a day 
for more than two weeks to produce the energy equivalent of one litre of crude oil. This highlights 
our reliance on energy and cautions against romanticising the pre- Industrial Revolution age, when 
life was constant struggle against scarcity for everyone no matter where (s)he lived.33 
 
In the 1960s most policymakers, industry leaders, and scientists were not really concerned over the 
sufficiency of cheap oil, let alone other fossil fuels, on which the society became all the more reliant. 
In the words of Susan Strange, ‘people thought the supply of oil was inexhaustible and would continue 
to flow uninterruptedly for ever.’34 All this changed in 1973 when the first oil crisis hit the 
industrialised world. It was instigated by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) which proclaimed an oil embargo resulting in quadrupled prices in just half a year. This 
marked the second phase which underlined energy’s importance. All the actors of energy policy and 
the public began to believe that inexpensive oil might not always be available. Moreover, piling 
evidence suggesting finite oil supplies urged states, industries, companies, and others actors to look 
for alternative sources of energy. If oil reserves ran out, the consequences for electricity and heat 
production, the basic industries, transport, agriculture, and households would be catastrophic. The 
20th century society would quickly come almost to a halt. The oil crisis of 1973 had many long-lasting 
effects. In Europe, supranational institutions led by the Commission prepared to reintroduce energy 
onto the Community’s political agenda where it had not been since the start of the European 
                                                 
29 Energy Tribune 2010. 
30 Smith 2011a. 
31 Energy Tribune 2010. 
32 Birchfield and Duffield 2011, 1–9. 
33 Smith 2011b, 71–72; 79. 
34 Strange 1988, 205. 
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integration in the 1950s.35 36 Accordingly, interest in natural gas rose significantly worldwide,37 but 
this did not prevent new oil crises, such as in 1979, nor did it preclude disruptions in the supply of 
natural gas too. This was clearly demonstrated in Europe during Russia–Ukraine gas dispute in winter 
of 2006 when, after Russia stopped delivering gas for its Ukrainian customers because of 
disagreement on price, Ukraine diverted some of the gas volumes destined to Europe for its own use, 
causing shortfalls of deliveries of Russian gas to central European countries.38  
 
While the world energy consumption has continued to grow, insecurities in the supply of oil and gas 
have led to a resurgence in coal production.39 This was the policy adopted in Denmark in the 1970s.40 
However, from the 1980s onwards, apprehensions over the environmental effects of energy policies 
gained ground. Denmark was among the frontrunners pursuing alternative resources, particularly with 
its investments into wind power.41 I would characterise this period, which we are still living in, as the 
third phase of energy dependency. Unfortunately, from an environmental point of view more than 80 
percent of global primary energy supply comes from hydrocarbons – oil, coal and natural gas.42 
Although the total primary energy supply of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries has been decreasing in recent years, the whole world’s energy supply keeps 
growing, mainly because of the rapid expansion of Chinese and other emerging market economies.43 
Very recently there have been indications of slowing down of the latter, but it still remains to be seen 
how it will affect global energy supply.44 45 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), global land and ocean surface temperatures have risen 0.85 degrees Celsius over the 
period of 1880–2012, and it is extremely likely that humans are causing most of the warming through 
burning fossil fuels which intensify the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.46 47 
Climate changes are already causing impacts on natural and human systems. The former include, for 
example, heat waves, floods, melting glaciers and permafrost. Moreover, the changes that are 
occurring may themselves accelerate global warming. If, for instance, the Siberian permafrost melts, 
                                                 
35 Andersen 2000. 
36 Solorio and Morata 2012, 11–13. 
37 Our Finite World 2012. 
38 Pirani 2012, 176–177. 
39 Our Finite World 2012. 
40 Danish Wind Industry Association 2002, 1–2. 
41 Ibid., 1–3. 
42 IEA 2014a. 
43 IEA 2015, 6–8. 
44 IMF 2015. 
45 BBC 2015. 
46 IPCC 2013. 
47 NASA 2015, ref. Bloomberg 2015. 
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it will escalate the release of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, so drastically, some researchers 
argue that it will increase the atmospheric methane burden 12 times.48 As for the latter, decreasing 
crop yields, rising sea levels and more frequent extreme weather make human settlement in coastal 
zones and drylands more dangerous or almost impossible, and this is clearly visible on all continents 
and sea areas.49 If the average temperature rises more than two degrees, the consequences will be far-
reaching. The question of energy supply is thus more imperative than ever. At the same time when 
the world needs increasing amount of energy, it should more rapidly switch the climate change 
inducing energy sources to low-carbon power. 
 
Therefore, it has been rightly argued that the whole economic and social well-being of the peoples, 
the industry and the economy relies on safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy.50 In the case 
of the European Union (hereafter the EU) which is greatly dependent on imported oil and gas, this is 
especially true.51 Until December last year the world lacked a legally binding and worldwide 
international climate change agreement. The Kyoto Protocol did not qualify as such, for the 
developing countries were not issued any binding targets, and the United States, then the biggest 
polluter, never ratified the treaty. Furthermore, countries such as Russia, Japan and New Zealand did 
not agree on any mandatory targets for the Protocol’s second commitment period (stretching from 
2013 to 2020; the first commitment period was in 2008–2012), and Canada withdrew from it 
altogether.52 The few non-EU countries taking part in the second period included, for instance, 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine. The world leaders reached a climate agreement in Paris 
in December 2015 (of which more below), but many countries had already consented to reducing 
their greenhouse gas emissions through various mechanisms either on their own or, as in the case of 
the EU, in regional blocs. This is the subject of this master’s dissertation. I will examine how two EU 
countries, namely Denmark and Finland, are aiming to transform their energy systems. That is, how 
will they secure their energy supply in the short-, medium-, and long-term while simultaneously 
pledging to decarbonise their energy supply and energy consumption almost entirely by the end of 
the respective period.53 54 I will also make an argument about the reasons why Denmark and Finland 
are pursuing their energy supply in the way they have outlined in their strategies. By the short-term I 
refer to time period stretching from the publication of a relevant energy and climate strategy to 2020. 
                                                 
48 Shakhova et al. 2008. 
49 See more in IPCC 2014. 
50 European Commission 2010, 2. 
51 See for instance Eurostat 2015. 
52 See for example UNFCCC 2014. 
53 Danish Government 2013, 14. 
54 Finnish Government 2014, 10. 
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The time frame for the medium-term is in 2020–2030, and the reason for this is because the EU has 
agreed on further, post-2020 energy targets for 2030. Hence, the long-term indicates the 2030–2050 
period, for the energy roadmaps of the EU and its member states reach the middle of the century. 
However, I will not conduct the analysis in three stages, going forward from one time frame to 
another. Instead, I will analyse the material through the lenses of one piece of analytical framework 
at a time, of which more below. All the same, time is an essential factor in this kind of study which 
focuses both on the present day, the near-future, and the rather distant one. Therefore, I find it 
necessary to classify time frames in some categories. 
1.4. International climate agreement – at last 
The worldwide and legally binding climate agreement was reached among the world leaders in global 
climate change conference in Paris during the time of writing of this thesis. My original intention was 
not to concentrate on global climate agreements, but the signed treaty deserves to be dealt with some 
detail, for it likely will alter the policy environments within which energy policy actors, especially 
states, operate. My material consists of Danish and Finnish energy and climate strategies, which could 
hardly predict specifically when an international climate deal would be reached. Nonetheless, 
presumably the states in question counted on that the world would come to sign a treaty sooner or 
later, making it easier for them, too, to transform their energy systems.  Conventional thinking argued 
clean energy cannot yet compete with cheap coal, and thus countries that keep burning coal gained a 
competitive edge over those who did not.55 However, if all states truly became dedicated to phasing 
out coal and other fossil fuels that would offset the disparity. How much Denmark and Finland relied 
on a global climate agreement will be reflected later in the analysis. No doubt their next energy and 
climate strategies will look partly different but in this dissertation I will have to use papers which 
they have produced in the last five years. 
 
The governments agreed to prevent global average temperatures from increasing close to 2 degrees 
Celsius above the pre-industrial level. Further, the governments are aiming to limit the increase to 1.5 
°C, for this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.56 After years of failure 
to reach any agreement at all, the ambitiousness of the Paris deal regarding emission reductions came 
as a surprise for many.57 58 Apparently scientific evidence about the harsh effects of climate change, 
                                                 
55 TIME 2013. 
56 See for example European Commission 2016a. 
57 National Geographic 2015. 
58 ABC 2015. 
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that would occur even if warming was halted to 2 degrees, became simply undeniable, e.g. low-lying 
Pacific nations such as the Marshall Islands would still sink.59 The treaty also acknowledged the need 
for global emissions to peak as soon as possible – understanding that this would take longer for 
developing countries – and then take rapid reductions thereafter.60 The targets will be revised every 
five years and the countries’ progress monitored. However, there is still urgent need for improvement, 
for the national climate plans the states submitted during the Paris conference, let alone the policies 
already conducted, are not nearly enough to limit warming even to 2 degrees. According to Climate 
Action Tracker (CAT), a scientific analysis produced by four research organisations, implementing 
all the pledges in the national climate plans would result in around 2.7 °C of warming in 2100. With 
the policies governments have in place already, the world would be heading towards warming of 3.6 
°C by the end of the century.61 
1.5. Energy policy of the EU 
Arguably, EU countries are at the forefront to combat climate change, though one must assess such 
claims with caution.62 However, one has to merely take a glance in the energy and climate targets 
agreed on international and EU level to note that to a large extent this argument is valid. While the 
international community was just reaching the stage of agreeing on the need for global emissions to 
peak soon, the EU had already implemented measures to reduce its emissions by tens of percents, not 
to mention the other legally binding targets. Prior to 2020 energy and climate targets, the EU reduced 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% from 1990 levels during the first Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period from 2008–2012. That is why I find it fruitful to concentrate on the European energy policy in 
this thesis. Examining the EU countries’ plans to undertake energy transition, which ultimately will 
be necessary for all were the world to avoid the unmanageable consequences of climate change, seems 
a justified approach to shed light on how the energy and climate targets can possibly be met. 
 
In the last five years or so, the EU has adopted ambitious targets for energy and climate policy 
outlined in a number of documents, including the 2020 Energy Strategy and Energy Roadmap 2050. 
By 2020, it aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels, improve its energy 
efficiency by 20% (i.e. reduce energy consumption by 20% by 2020 compared to the projected energy 
consumption in 2020, based on projections made in 2007), and increase the share of renewable energy 
                                                 
59 National Geographic 2015. 
60 European Commission 2016a. 
61 CAT 2015. 
62 Youngs 2013, 421–425. 
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to at least 20% of consumption (including 10% share of renewables in transport).63 The 2020 Energy 
Strategy also introduced national targets which would better reflect the initial situations at individual 
state level. Not only has the EU agreed on remarkable energy and climate targets, it is also as a whole 
well on track to meeting them. In 2015, 24 countries were expected to achieve their greenhouse gas 
targets; 20 to achieve their renewables targets; and likewise 20 to reach the energy efficiency targets. 
Additionally, 13 member states were on schedule to deliver their national targets in all three areas, 
whereas a year before only nine were on track.64 Finland’s emission reduction and energy efficiency 
targets are the same as EU-level targets, but it pursues to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in its final consumption to 38%.65 Denmark has set an ambitious target of 40% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.66 The country’s energy efficiency target is also in line with that 
of the EU and it has pledged to increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 35%.67 
 
Furthermore, the European Council reached an agreement over the energy and climate targets for 
2030 in October 2014. As the conclusions of the agreement read, emissions were to be cut by 40% 
from the 1990 levels, the share of renewables in the energy mix must be at least 27%, and energy 
efficiency was to be increased by 27%. The former two were binding targets on EU-level, the latter 
was merely indicative.68 Moreover, neither the energy efficiency target nor the renewable energy 
target is nationally binding.69 In the long term, the EU committed to cutting emissions by 80–95% of 
the 1990 levels by 2050 while maintaining or improving the security of energy supply and 
competitiveness, as envisaged in the Energy Roadmap 2050.70 
 
To fully understand how the EU’s energy policy is closely linked with those of its member states 
keep in mind that emissions arising from various sectors are treated differently. Emissions from 
electricity and heat generation, heavy manufacturing industry, and aviation are part of the EU 
Emission Trading System (the ETS), which cover around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.71 In 2013, the respective number was 41% for Denmark and 52% for Finland.72 73 Every 
power plant, factory, and other installation is granted a certain limit of CO2 which it can emit within 
                                                 
63 European Commission 2010, 3. 
64 European Environment Agency 2015a, 16–55. 
65 Finnish Government 2013, 7. 
66 Danish Government 2013, 14. 
67 Danish Energy Agreement 2012, 4. 
68 European Council 2014, 1–6. 
69 Ibid., 6. 
70 European Commission 2011. 
71 See for instance European Commission 2016b. 
72 European Environment Agency 2015b, 2. 
73 European Environment Agency 2015c, 2. 
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a given time period. This cap is reduced over time – and it cannot be crossed – so that a desired 
emissions fall is forcibly reached (an EU-wide target for the ETS sector is 21% emission reduction 
by 2020 compared to 2005 level).74 If, say, a power plant invests in energy efficiency and thus does 
not need all the CO2 allowances it has been given, it can sell the excess allowances to other actors 
within the ETS. Correspondingly, a factory which has exceeded its quota must buy the extra 
allowances it needs. The idea is to encourage energy policy actors to switch, in one way or another, 
to forms of production and consumption which produce fewer emissions. The price of CO2 
allowances is determined by market rules, i.e. by supply and demand.  Arguably, the ETS spot price 
has to be high enough to give a real incentive for power plants and others to invest in renewable 
energy sources or energy efficiency, but for a long time, the ETS carbon spot price remained low; for 
the whole year of 2013, around €5 per tonne of CO2.75 When the price of carbon dioxide does not 
actually compel energy companies and other actors to take efforts which would contribute in reaching 
the energy and climate targets, additional measures and tools were required both from the EU and the 
member states. 
 
In contrast, emissions from transport (excluding aviation), agriculture, buildings, and waste are 
treated as non-ETS sectors, and they are part of the so called Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) which 
sets binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for each member state. Since the recent, overall 
EU target is a sum of the national targets, action from every member state is required. Although there 
are EU measures which can assist the member states in reaching these targets, for the most part they 
require action on the national level.76  
 
Obviously, the aforementioned targets will require considerable changes and enormous investments 
in every sector on international, regional, national and local level. But striving towards a low-carbon 
economy presents a huge opportunity for companies and countries exporting renewable energy 
technology and cleantech solutions. For instance, the size of the global cleantech market was €1.6 
trillion in 2012, and the market was estimated to grow about 7–8% annually.77 Since reaching a global 
climate agreement, the demand for green technology will most likely increase even further. Still, there 
is no point to argue that green energy transition comes at no cost. But it makes equally little sense to 
argue that it is not necessary – the cost of not decarbonising our energy systems eventually is even 
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greater,78 not only in economic79 but – or especially – in human and environmental terms.80 However, 
in order to reach the climate targets in an economically feasible way, the EU member states must 
reformulate their energy mixes and energy infrastructures in a way that neglects none of the elements 
in the ‘energy trinity’: (1) (increased) security of supply; (2) economic competitiveness through 
affordable prices; (3) environmental sustainability.81 
 
As previously outlined, this thesis aims to shed light on how two EU member states, namely Denmark 
and Finland, attempt to secure their economies’ continuous access to energy between the present to 
2050. It bears mentioning that none of the elements of the energy trinity can be analysed in total 
isolation from the others. Indeed, they do overlap and sometimes align together, but they can also 
contradict one another. For instance, phasing out some energy sources on environmental grounds may 
increase dependency on imports; some renewable energy technologies may not be able to compete 
with fossil fuels, at least not without subsidies etc. Due to the scope of this kind of research and in 
the interest of comparing different countries, the focus will be narrowed down to one element, security 
of supply. 
 
The reason is that I’m mostly interested in studying how the member states can contribute to achieving 
the commonly agreed energy and climate targets. Indeed, one hardly needs to emphasise how crucial 
their role is.82 While the European energy policy is defined by the coordinated action of the EU and 
of its member states, it is the security of supply on which the member states still have full 
sovereignty.83 As the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reads, each member state has 
the ‘right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply’.84 This is also carefully reflected in the 
2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, where it reads that ‘[the energy and climate] targets 
will be achieved while fully respecting the Member States' freedom to determine their energy mix.’85 
Hence, I find the composition of the member states’ future energy mix, designed to guarantee their 
secure access to energy and defined in their national energy and climate strategies, as the most 
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meaningful way to scrutinise how the member states are aiming to reach the ambitious energy and 
climate targets. 
 
Notably though, despite the member states having full de jure sovereignty in defining security of 
supply, de facto EU legislation could set several limits on them. For instance, shale gas and shale oil 
explorations and extraction are covered by EU environmental legislation, therefore their use can 
possibly be restricted.86 Another example is that heavily subsidising some production forms might 
contradict EU competition laws. It follows that in some respects, common EU policies regarding 
security of supply can be deemed beneficial or even necessary by the member states. Such stances 
are possibly reflected in the material chosen for this study. 
 
It is evident that there is not only one way to reach the energy and climate targets while at the same 
time taking care of the energy needs of the industry, companies, households, and the whole society. 
To be able to say anything about the possibly quite varied ways to achieve the energy targets without 
neglecting any of the elements of the energy trinity, at least two different states should be the subject 
of this study. Of course the means Denmark and Finland are using might well be similar, but that 
remains to be seen in the analysis. In any case, it should prove useful for further research, and indeed 
for policymakers, to have some knowledge of the range of choices states can make to achieve the 
demanding, ambitious, and yet essential energy and climate targets. 
1.6. Why Denmark and Finland? 
So securing energy supply through reasonable planning of future energy mix, which is also in line 
with the energy and climate goals, is the most meaningful instrument states have in their own 
repertoire to complete the energy transition that inexorably lies ahead. However, the reader might 
legitimately ask at this point, why have I chosen to examine the cases of Denmark and Finland in this 
dissertation – why not some other countries? Before moving on to discuss the specified research 
question and the central concept for this thesis, security of supply, I shall add a few remarks on why 
have I picked exactly these two Nordic countries as the objects of analysis for my work. 
 
First of all, this is a thesis done in a Finnish university so it is only natural that Finland receives a 
special interest. While the EU energy policy is a fruitful subject from the perspective of green energy 
transition, Finnish energy policy is, in my interpretation, even more so; in some respects, the country 
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pursues more ambitious energy and climate policy than the EU as a whole, aiming to increase the 
share of renewable energy to 38% by 2020. Still, the share of renewables in electricity production is 
even bigger in neighbouring countries like Sweden or non-EU country Norway. Why is this so and 
would these countries make a meaningful pair for comparison with Finland? Not really in my view, 
since this is largely due to the much bigger hydropower sector in the respective countries (although 
Sweden has a large capacity of wind power production too). Annually, Sweden generates around 66 
terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity and Norway as much as 127 TWh by hydropower, while Finland 
produces 12 TWh.87 88 89 Undoubtedly, the conditions for hydroelectricity production are ideal in 
Norway and Sweden, and further, better than in Finland because of the greater annual rainfall and the 
vast amounts of melt water streaming from the Scandinavian Mountains. Hydropower is a well-
established sector, and there is little room to increase its capacity in Northern Europe or most parts 
of the world. There are only certain amounts of big rivers, and they are already utilised for 
hydroelectricity production in most cases. Moreover, there are hardly any new suitable places for 
dams.90 Besides, hydropower, despite being nearly carbon neutral, can be very harmful for the society 
and the environment. Dams may force people, wildlife and agriculture to emigrate elsewhere. They 
can also cause political tensions if situated on a border river,91 and hydroelectric plants without fish 
passages can be fatal for entire migrating fish stocks.92 
 
Much more peculiar than the role of the hydropower sector is that of the wind power, and it is here 
where Denmark comes into picture. Finland has increased its wind power capacity rapidly – last year 
it grew by 60% reaching narrowly the limit of 1 gigawatt (GW) – and hence its production, which 
totalled to 2.3 TWh in 2015.93 It is still very small compared to Denmark. The southernmost Nordic 
country has five times more wind power capacity than Finland, and its production amounted to 14.1 
TWh in 2015.94 Hence the question is, why is there so big a difference between these two countries? 
The limits for the increment of wind power capacity are nowhere near exhausted, neither in the Nordic 
countries nor in the world, but the opposite is true with hydropower. The biggest disputes concern 
land use, but wind farms can also be built in the sea, either near or offshore.  If land use problems 
have been resolved in densely populated Denmark, which is much smaller in size than sparsely 
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populated Finland, they can hardly explain the differences in the respective countries’ wind power 
capacity. 
 
Finnish public discussion commonly predicate that it is not windy enough in the country to produce 
wind power cost-efficiently.95 Is it simply much windier in Denmark than in Finland, thus optimizing 
wind power production within the borders of the former than the latter? The wind simulations based 
on statistics do not support this claim, as the two maps below illustrate. 
Source: Troen and Lundtang Petersen 1989. Copyright © 1989 by Risø National Laboratory, 
Roskilde, Denmark. 
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The average annual wind resources in Finland at 50 meters above ground level. This map is on 
2.5x2.5 square kilometre spatial resolution and thus more accurate than the former. Unfortunately I 
was unable to locate a corresponding data for Denmark, but the current version should provide a 
general view. Source: Finnish Wind Atlas. 
 
There are differences in windiness considering the inland areas of Denmark and Finland, but around 
the lakes, which are very plentiful in Finland, the average wind speed comes close 6–7 m/s. On the 
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Lapland fjelds, the average annual wind blows even faster. Not taking the northwest of Jutland into 
account, there are not many discrepencies – at least not enough to explain the differences in size of 
wind power capacity regarding these two countries – in wind resources in coastal zones and open sea. 
Similar environmental conditions should make wind power technology, more or less, equally 
economically feasible in both countries. Since its introduction in the 1980s, the cost of generating 
electricity from wind power has fallen significantly and further reductions are likely when taller 
turbines with longer blades increase the capacity and efficiency of the machines. Already in some 
states in the US, wind power can compete with coal.96 The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
predicts that in 2020 the levelised cost of electricity (which is often used as a measure of the overall 
competitiveness of different technologies, taking into account capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and 
variable operations and maintenance cost, assumed life-cycle for each power-plant etc.) for onshore 
wind power will be 74 US$ per megawatt-hours (MWh) on average.97 This will make onshore wind 
equally competitive in economic terms with the most cost-efficient natural gas-fired power plant types 
and second only to geothermal energy, leaving all the other energy production forms behind.98 
 
In short, the inherently material basis for energy policy, i.e. the resources, cannot self-evidently 
explain the huge differences in wind power capacity between Denmark and Finland – the same way 
the resource structure, arguably, explains the difference in hydropower capacity between Finland and 
Norway. It seems that policymakers and other energy policy actors in the respective states have 
simply estimated the prominence and suitability of, and need for, wind power in very diverging terms. 
This might be for all sorts of reasons, say, the influence of different lobbyists, the interpretation of 
available information, or the (dis-)advantages of other energy production technologies. But unless 
Finland is planning to increase its wind power capacity ultra-rapidly to approximately match it with 
that of Denmark – which I do not believe – the different views of the surrounding policy environment, 
on which the states as a whole base their assessments of possible policy choices, must still be 
prevalent. How exactly do their views differ, is what I will try to uncover in this thesis. Since I don’t 
have the possibility to trace which lobbyists were heard in the preparation of energy strategies, what 
information the government officials give the biggest value etc., I will form a theoretical model with 
which I could say something about the governments’ interpretations of the energy policy 
environment. This is the subject of the next section. 
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The fact that Denmark and Finland have invested in wind power in such a distinct manner in relation 
to each other, was the central motive for me to choose this subject. It has also guided me in 
formulation of the theoretical and methodological framework for the study. However, it must be noted 
that I do not wish to concentrate on this particular aspect only. My aim is to reach an understanding 
of the respective countries overall energy policy. But the inspiration for this study came from the 
great differences in wind power sector. 
 
Motivational grounds aside, I would still argue that Denmark and Finland qualify as an adequate pair 
for the method employed in this thesis, namely comparative case study, of which more in the section 
3. As the logic in comparative case study goes, the cases selected must predict similar results or 
produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons.99 On one hand, these countries are very similar 
in some respects. They are both developed, Nordic welfare countries who most arguably can be said 
to be in a good position to do their bit to combat climate change. In addition to the EU energy and 
climate targets, some of their national goals are almost identical (such as nearly 100% share of 
renewables in energy production and transport sector by 2050).100 101 Conversely, there are also 
notable differences between the countries which make them an interesting pair to compare. Firstly, 
some of the manufacturing sectors vary quite a lot in size; mining and manufacture of food products 
occupy a bigger share in Danish than Finnish industry, whereas energy-intensive lumber and paper 
industries are significantly more important in Finland than Denmark. Secondly, Finland is sparsely 
populated, Denmark rather densely. Thirdly, Denmark is a net exporter of energy and receives 
revenues by selling oil and natural gas; in turn, oil and gas imports increase Finland’s current account 
deficit. This paper will attempt to uncover which factors could possibly explain the differences and 
similarities in Danish and Finnish plans for the low-carbon energy transition. Such analysis could, of 
course, be conducted correspondingly to other EU member states as well. What I hope to achieve, is 
to shed at least some light on what could be taken better into account regarding country-specific 
characteristics when planning further energy and climate targets on a supranational level. It is also 
possible that the strengths in either country’s strategies could be taken into use elsewhere, too. 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
I hope I have provided in this section a coherent account of the historical development and 
contemporary circumstances of energy policy, convinced the reader of the significance of the subject 
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of this study, and justified acceptably why the EU countries, Denmark and Finland, make an 
interesting comparison. I also wish that the central concept is crystal clear and the reader has a proper 
picture in mind of what exactly am I going to do. The next section covers the theoretical background 
for this thesis, and reviews the pros and cons of established approaches in energy policy research 
specifically with regards to this study. I will then unpack how I formulated my own framework, based 
on the idea of structuration, as understood by Anthony Giddens and Alexander Wendt, as the 
theoretical point of departure, and introduce the works of Susan Strange102 and Aalto et al.103 from 
which I draw much in this study. Finally as a summary of all the theoretical discussion I shall present 
my own model. 
 
The third section will give an account on the methodological approach used in this work. It will briefly 
assess the role of methodology in general – what does it actually mean, what it is and what it is not, 
and how to actually use it. After that I will discuss in more detail the method, namely comparative 
case study, I have chosen for the study. The analysis will be carried out in the section four. The first 
subsection will introduce the material, and the second and third subsections, will analyse Danish and 
Finnish strategies, respectively, responding to the research questions of how is the state going to 
secure its security of energy supply in 2020–2050, and why is it planning to do it in this exact manner. 
As I argue, their choices can at least partially be explained on the basis of their assessments of the 
surrounding structures. Therefore, I will go through the states’ interpretations of each dimension of 
my model outlined in the section 2.5. The last section will cover the conclusions and evaluate their 
validity. 
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2. Contemporary theoretical models and framework for the study 
2.1. Established approaches 
To begin with assessing the theoretical framework for the study at hand, it must be noted that 
theoretically oriented International Relations approaches are currently severely underused in energy 
policy research.104 This is equally true regarding International Political Economy,105 as well as 
security studies. One illustrative example being, the fact that the principal journal in international 
relations and security studies, International Security, had published only eight articles devoted to 
energy in its then 30-year history.106 It has been said that energy is a classic case of ‘no man’s land’, 
an area that lies between social sciences, largely unexplored or unoccupied by any major field of 
study.107  In the existing research, there are some prevailing, well-established approaches, such as 
energy diplomacy, geopolitics and energy security, and energy economics and trade.108 One emerging 
approach, namely energy and the environment, has probably already institutionalised itself, at least 
in the context of European energy policy.109 110 Each of these approaches will be examined in more 
detail, after which their relevance to this study will be summarised before moving on to the 
development of the framework for the thesis.  
 
Before beginning it must be said that the following description of the above-mentioned approaches 
inevitably generalises a lot. It is not possible here to make a deep review on several aspects of energy 
policy research. Rather, I will have to remain on ‘ideal type’ level.111 I would expect that there are 
variations in the literature and not all scholars want to follow rigorously defined traditions. However, 
the energy policy community arguably does focus on very selective aspects of global energy policy.112 
Therefore, I find the following, rather generalising discussion, justified. 
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2.1.1. Energy diplomacy 
Energy diplomacy aims to describe the dependencies and interdependencies of energy producers and 
consumers, of developing and developed countries, and of regional blocs and institutions.113 114 In the 
context of EU–Russia energy relations, this approach highlights the prospects and hardships of 
economic integration in the Eurasian continent whilst striving to enhance political cooperation 
between the two biggest players in the region, namely the EU and Russia.115 The scholars of Chinese 
energy policy recognise China’s huge appetite for, and growing dependency of, foreign energy 
resources which direct it to form close ties especially with oil and gas exporters in Asia and Africa.116 
Therefore, the country stresses the importance of seeking common ground with different actors with 
their variant interests in order to forge a favourable balance with all the parties involved in global 
energy policy. China finds developed countries, especially the United States, disproportionally 
represented in the international energy regime. It strives to alter the balance in its favour and get 
recognition worldwide.117 
 
Summits, negotiations, state visits, agreements, programmes for cooperation in financial and 
economic affairs and diplomatic conflict resolution provide the basic material for energy diplomacy 
researchers.118 119 The picture they convey of energy policy is strongly agent-centric.120 Through the 
lenses of energy diplomacy, the actors of each respective policy field have, by far, the most influence 
on what kind of energy policy is practiced. They are not constrained much by the policy environments 
where they operate but rather, are able to define and pursue their own interests. Energy diplomacy 
scholars regard states, regional blocs, institutions, and political and business leaders as the core actors 
who have the most say in forming and negotiating energy policy.121 
 
Undoubtedly, energy diplomacy has a lot to say about why the new global climate agreement could 
be reached in Paris on December 2015. It is worth noting that at least Finland kept some of its own 
long-term energy and climate targets, only indicative if a global climate agreement could not be 
forged. However, this provides a very narrow answer to the questions of how Finland and Denmark 
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are going to secure their energy supply in the future and why so. Negotiations, bargains, alliances and 
competition with others cannot explain the full content of national energy and climate strategies of 
the two countries. Furthermore, the energy diplomacy approach is only usually applied when the 
dependent variable, state, regional bloc, institution, corporation etc., is relatively big like China, 
Russia, or the EU. There is possibly a fair explanation to this: small states like Finland and Denmark, 
with their limited significance and capacity, are rarely in a position where they can negotiate, let alone 
define, the rules of energy policy on their own. Besides, as EU member states, both of these countries 
align much, and increasingly,122 with the EU’s energy policy, leaving themselves little space to 
bargain on a national level. Finally, I find that the agent-centricity of energy diplomacy clearly limits 
its explanatory power. The interests of the agents and what they really negotiate for are, in my 
interpretation, taken too much for granted. The idea that the surrounding policy environment, the 
structure, can and frequently does have an effect on what the actors of energy policy perceive as 
necessary, satisfactory, or possible in the first place, does not receive much attention among energy 
diplomacy approach. 
2.1.2 Geopolitics and energy security 
Energy and (international) security overlap in multiple ways. This intersection is in the centre of 
studies leaning towards geopolitics and energy security approaches.123 124 One framework for thinking 
about the relation between energy and security is to explore how the former shapes the political, 
military, economic, and diplomatic strategies that countries develop.125 First, energy might be seen 
as an ends itself, of a ‘grand strategy’ which urges the leaders of a country to find ways to provide 
secure access to energy resources at a reasonable price to their people, economy, and industry.126 
Plainly, every state that wants to survive must secure sufficient resources, and scholars argue that 
when a country’s energy needs are growing rapidly or are otherwise scarce, energy comes to dominate 
especially foreign policy. China’s engagement in Africa is one contemporary example; by 
constructing railways, roads and harbours, and granting loans and investments to host governments, 
China has received direct access to oil fields, obtained by its national oil companies.127 Second, 
energy might provide tools through which countries can further their interests in another policy areas. 
These might include recognition and power in international arenas, access to international decision-
making bodies and influence over, say, neighbouring countries. Russo–Ukrainian gas conflict in 2006 
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is an often mentioned example of this. Third, energy can provide means, i.e. the resources and 
revenues, for states to pursue their foreign or domestic policies, which can have implications for 
international security. For instance, Iran has spent an estimate 100–200 million USD every year to 
support Lebanese Hezbollah. Without revenues from fossil fuels, it could have hardly done so.128  
 
In the context of the EU, geopolitics and energy security approaches situate Russia and its energy 
policy into the context of geopolitics and interregional competition.129 130 Scholars highlight the 
importance of maintaining a close energy dialogue with Russia, despite disagreements and problems 
in other policy areas. Furthermore, they stress how crucial it is for the EU to diversify its energy mix 
in order to reduce dependency on Russian gas, which accounted for 42% of the EU’s gas imports in 
2009.131 132 This calls for deeper energy cooperation with the Caspian states and actions to strengthen 
the EU’s energy partnership with the Middle East states.133 Other issues that are frequently examined 
within the geopolitics and energy security approach include Russian pipeline politics and gas disputes 
between Russia and Belarus in 2004 and 2007, and between Russia and Ukraine in 2006.134 Prevalent 
interpretations in this framework conclude that Russia’s energy policy and pipeline projects aim to 
ensure Russia’s national interest and increasing power in traditional, realist terms.135 
 
Although both approaches discussed so far in section 2.1. agree on who the central actors in energy 
policy are, – the only difference being that energy diplomacy approach sees a role for business leaders 
too whereas geopolitics and energy security approaches emphasise the meaning of state-bound 
companies as such – their understanding of the formation, alteration, and significance of the actors’ 
preferences differ.  Unlike the energy diplomacy approach, the explanatory model of geopolitics and 
energy security approaches can best be understood as very structural-objectivist. Material factors, the 
surrounding structures, i.e. who has what resources and how much, seem very much to determine one 
actor’s policy.136 I don’t find this a fruitful departure point for this study. No doubt the surrounding 
structures and the policy environments in which energy policy is conducted, direct, allow, and limit 
some actions the actors can make, but I don’t see the actors as completely deadlocked in the structures. 
Their own preferences and goals count as well, and they are not dictated merely by the ‘national 
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interest’, which I find rather vague concept in the first place. It is also worth noting that the 
preferences of actors may, and do, change, a concept which is not fully appreciated in geopolitics and 
energy security approaches. They offer valuable insights on, for example, (inter-)dependency, 
vulnerabilities, and power accumulation which will be taken into account in this study. However, for 
me geopolitics and energy security approaches, just like energy diplomacy approach, seem 
insufficient frameworks on their own to provide a decent explanatory model for Finnish and Danish 
national energy and climate strategies. 
2.1.3. Energy economics and trade 
The main focus of energy economics and trade approach tends to be on making the markets work, 
fixing any shortcomings, and fostering technological innovation.137 Scholars in this framework 
concentrate mostly on quantifiable issues such as energy resources, market mechanics and other 
energy economic related phenomena.138 Common subjects for studies in the approach include; market 
imbalances such as energy cartels,139 energy as public goods,140 and state-owned energy companies 
and their effect on energy production, investment, and pricing.141 
 
Sometimes energy economics and trade approach is coupled with geopolitics. These studies, rightly, 
point out that security of supply is closely related to micro- and macroeconomic developments, but 
they take place in a specific geopolitical settings and both influence each other.142 One possible way 
to look at this is to create two storylines which can predict the future development of a state’s energy 
policy. Correljé and van der Linde call these Markets and Institutions and Regions and Empires. The 
former storyline will be more accurate if states align their energy policy with market mechanics. In 
that case further globalisation of energy markets and institutionalisation of multilateral international 
system prevail. The latter storyline predicts multilateral international system to be dismantled into 
competing regional blocks, which may stir rivalry over the control of resources.143 As the dynamics 
of international politics and economics are intensively intertwined, scholars stress that any singular 
approach to security of energy supply, or other aspects of energy policy, may not be enough.144 
Energy economics and trade should be combined with whole other approaches as well. By bringing 
together economic and environmental factors, it could be argued that putting a higher price on coal, 
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e.g. through carbon tax, is a truly effective way to reduce the use of polluting fossil fuels.145 It could 
also provide new impetus for the EU’s common energy policy and hence promote further 
integration.146  
 
Much of energy economics and trade approach is based on game theoretic assumptions which 
inevitably makes it rather agent-centric.147 As a highly agent-centric approach, I don’t consider energy 
economics and trade suitable for this study for the same reasons as energy diplomacy. It is also equally 
true with this approach that I don’t find it fully comprehensive alone for the purpose of my study. 
Still, its notions of market mechanics and the actor landscape148 – along with states, regional blocs 
and institutions this approach include companies and financial institutions –, are important to keep in 
mind and integrate in the final framework of this dissertation. 
2.1.4. Energy and the environment 
Much of the research of the fourth approach, energy and the environment, concentrates on the energy 
policy of the European Union and how the various forms of EU energy policy affect the environment. 
This follows logically from the state of affairs in the field: the EU and its member states being at the 
forefront of integrating climate and other environmental aspects into the energy strategies.149 Not 
only are environmental concerns reflected in the various documents the EU has produced, but the 
Union has also a plethora of instruments to actually reach its ‘energy trinity goals’.150 Moreover, the 
environmental perspective is, more or less, taken into account in three of five dimensions in the EU’s 
new framework strategy for the Energy Union, namely decarbonisation of the economy; energy 
efficiency; and research, innovation and competitiveness.151 
 
Some researchers argue that though energy was initially at the core of European integration in the 
1950s, it never developed far enough to lay the foundations for a truly common energy policy, which 
led it to be considered as a great failure of integration.152 However, from the 1970s onwards the energy 
policy integration has advanced, and according to some, it got its impetus from environmental 
concerns regarding the energy chain.153 This happened shortly after the oil crisis and hence, the 
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environment was used as an excuse to legitimise Community intervention. Many argued that energy 
governance was ‘Europeanised’ before the EU had any formal competence in ‘green’ energy 
policy.154 As already mentioned, the EU has nowadays several, and possibly an increasing number 
of, instruments in its energy policy. As a result, it is used as ‘green-model’ for other countries and 
regional blocs in the world.155 156 
 
Other scholars remain more doubtful towards the EU’s role model position in ‘green’ energy 
policy.157 Despite its noble goals and manifested efforts to significantly ease the burden on the 
environment caused by the production, transportation, and consumption of energy, the EU has still 
come to set a primary importance to a rather conventional understanding of energy security. This is 
demonstrated by oil and gas diplomacy which has recently all but gained strength. The focus on non-
conventional fossil fuel sources is another example.158 Perhaps this explains why much of the 
literature referring to EU external energy governance covers the trends of the internal energy market 
rules,159 the market and geopolitical dimensions of EU energy policy,160 and the questions related to 
the security of supply.161 
 
As regards the actor landscape of this approach, it considers states, regional blocs, and institutions 
the central actors in energy policy, like all the other approaches above. In line with energy economics 
and trade, energy and the environment highlight the role of companies and financial institutions as 
their investments are deemed necessary for energy transformation. In this respect, the scholars of 
energy and the environment also count in scientists as the most important actors in energy policy, for 
the environmental implications of energy production and prominence of ‘green technologies’, which 
are of significance from this approach’s point of view, are precisely scientific questions. I would 
argue that emphasising the scientific, the ‘material’ factors make energy and the environment more 
nuanced in relation to agency and structure. However, energy governance – strategies, agreements, 
policy instruments – and financial/economic viability of ‘green technologies’ through various 
mechanisms, such as joint markets and subsidies, receive more attention, which conveys a slightly 
agent-centric picture of energy and the environment approach. Though better for this study’s needs 
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than strict agent- or structure-centricity, further adjustments are in place to find a balance between 
the actors’ preferences and the range of possible choices of the surrounding policy environments, i.e. 
the structure. Energy and the environment offers yet another valuable perspective to keep in mind in 
this dissertation. Environmental and climate concerns undoubtedly are taken into account in the 
national energy strategies, even more so in Denmark and Finland than in the EU countries on 
average.162 Yet, for the purpose of this study, environmental viewpoint should not be the primary, let 
alone only, perspective. The same is true with each approach dealt with above. 
2.1.5. Summary 
Four established approaches in energy policy research have been outlined. The classification I have 
used derives much from an earlier work of Aalto et al.163 To summarise, what distinguishes the 
abovementioned approaches is how they respond to the question of who is doing what in energy 
policy and why. They all accept states, regional blocs, and institutions as being actors in energy policy, 
but to a varying extent, they also see a role for business leaders (energy diplomacy), state-bound 
companies (geopolitics and energy security), companies and financial institutions (energy economics 
and trade), or scientists (energy and the environment). They underline the importance of somewhat 
different affairs, let it be summits and negotiations (energy diplomacy), binding security aspects 
tightly to energy policy (geopolitics and energy security), investment and finance (energy economics 
and trade), or ‘green transformation’ of energy systems (energy and the environment). The 
approaches also highlight the priority of partly different policy goals, e.g. political stability (energy 
diplomacy), relative economic gains (geopolitics and energy security), absolute economic gains 
(energy economics and trade), and reducing energy and emission intensity (energy and the 
environment).164 
 
From a theoretical perspective, these approaches can either be characterised as agent-centric or 
structure-centric. Most of them fit in the former category, although I find energy and the environment 
only slightly agent-centric, in contrast to energy diplomacy and energy economics and trade. This is 
due to the importance of environmental implications of different energy forms, phenomena which are 
mostly material in nature. Then again, geopolitics and energy security is best classified as strongly 
structure-centric because it seems common to argue within this approach that the determining element 
of any energy policy is who has what resources and how much. This is an old and continual debate 
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everywhere in social sciences about whether agents or prevalent social structure(s) have primacy in 
the creation and reproduction of social systems. I have already supported an approach that finds both 
the agents and structures meaningful for analysis in this study and therefore, I try to bridge them 
together. Perhaps the most well-known attempt to base both of these factors as part of the analysis is 
Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory.165 What Giddens did, mostly on a domestic level, Alexander 
Wendt pursued on the international.166 I will next turn to formulate the first theoretical starting point 
of this dissertation, the idea of structuration as outlined in the works of Giddens and Wendt. 
2.2. Social structuration and energy policy formation 
If the history of international relations can be understood through Great Debates, the same can be said 
about sociology. At least since the time of Émile Durkheim,167 many sociologists have reasoned that 
the societies we live in impose social constraints on our actions by setting limits to what we can do 
as individuals. Everyone has to fulfil her obligations which are written in law, everyone grows up in 
a social system that has certain beliefs, norms, and practices which would exist with or without him, 
and no one can buy (or barter) goods with money which is not accepted in the society. In this sense, 
society is external to us and it is as firm as the material world around us. This structure-centric view 
has received a lot of criticism especially from sociologists inspired by social interactionism. They 
argue that people are not the products of society but rather, its producers. Society consists of a myriad 
of individual actions. If people were not constantly creating and re-creating society through actions, 
it would obviously cease to exist. People assign meanings to different things and act accordingly. The 
same things may carry different meanings for different people, and they can change over time. 
 
As is evident from the subsections above, this debate is not limited to sociology but it preoccupies 
scholars in all social sciences.168 Due to the ‘nature’ of this field of academics, it is unlikely the debate 
over action versus structure will be wholly resolved. Yet, the differences between these two models 
are not too big to overcome. Although neither is fully sufficient, in some respects, both are valid. 
Probably the most well-known scholar attempting to bridge these two views is Anthony Giddens. 
Already several decades ago, he introduced the concept of structuration. Giddens argues that social 
institutions do exist before any given individual and, in that sense, are external to us.169 Institutions 
also do constrain the actions of each individual. Language is a commonly used example of this. Clear 
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communication requires adherence to grammatical rules and use of words which have well-
established meaning in the group. However, it is clearly misleading to suppose that society and its 
social structures are external to us in the same way the physical world is. While it is the case with 
every individual alone, it does not certainly apply to all individuals taken together. Obviously, if all 
human beings died this moment, nothing would remain of society, including the language. 
Furthermore, although society can constrain the actions of each individual, it does not determine 
them. Humans do not just passively react to events but they make choices.170 While language is 
socially structured, once an individual gains fluency, the possible variations seem almost infinite and 
she can also break the rules without being misunderstood. In short, societies – or any groups – have 
‘structure’ as long as people behave in a regular and relatively predictable manner. But ‘action’ is 
only possible because each individual possesses vast amount of socially structured knowledge. What 
follows is that structure and action are necessarily related to one another.171 
 
What does this kind of view mean for international relations or energy policy? Firstly, it allows the 
actors – let them be states, institutions, organisations etc. – to have their own goals, preferences, and 
interests which they can pursue. Their ambitions and actions are not determined by their geographical 
position, their size in land area or population, or the natural resources allocated within their borders. 
It also follows that certain (material) things do not always have the same meaning. Canada, for 
example, borders the United States, which has an estimated 7,100 nuclear warheads.172 Russia has 
only slightly more nuclear weapons, many of them situated much farther from Canada than the US 
ones but undeniably they are seen as more threatening to the state. They are the same substance but 
clearly not the same ‘thing’ for Canada. Weaponry arsenals, or any other material factors, do not 
dictate state’s policy. Secondly, structural positions at a given time do still matter. Actors cannot 
define, let alone, strive for their goals in vacuum. The surrounding policy environments, everything 
from geography to other actors and their relationships, constrain but also enable, any given actor. If 
a state wanted to practice a wise energy policy, it would have to form a comprehensive picture of the 
current state of affairs, develop a good understanding of factors limiting and extending the scope of 
its policy options, evaluate possible choices on how to move forward, and on its part try to recreate 
the surrounding structures so that they allow more leeway for the state to practice successful energy 
policy. Neglecting the structural position the state is in will most likely result in bad outcomes. For 
instance, an Eastern European country, say, Poland, could make a decision to stop importing gas from 
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Russia starting tomorrow, but this would lead it to catastrophe because substitutive sources that would 
answer to Polish needs are simply not available at this moment (not to mention the rising tension with 
Russia which would likely take place if Poland unilaterally cancelled their gas contract). 
 
This idea of structuration has been developed on an international level by Alexander Wendt. For 
Wendt, the most important actors are states, and he concentrates on the interaction between them and 
international social structures. Of course, a state is not an ‘individual’ strictly in the same sense as a 
single human being because it consists of several bodies and even competing forces. However, as a 
juridical sovereign in certain marked areas, a state is a member of ‘international society’. As such, 
they have their interests which they pursue in the structures of international society, and while doing 
so they encounter other members, states, of the society. To avoid utter anarchy, states must act, and 
be able to trust that other states will do the same, in relatively predictable and regular custom. This 
constrains and enables their actions but does not determine them. By engaging in international 
society, states can reproduce existing structures or create new ones.173 Thus, the idea behind 
structuration can easily be stretched from community or national level to international level. As is 
evident, in practice states, like many other actors as well such as companies, operate on multiple 
levels at the same time. My interpretation is that this merely underlines the explanatory power of 
structuration. Actors are surrounded by structures which can be complex, overlapping, and their 
boundaries might be blurred but each of them are upheld only through repetitive actions. 
 
Before moving on to discuss a couple of works of which I draw on regarding the theoretical 
framework of this study, I shall add a few notions on the concept of structuration. First, Giddens talks 
mainly about social structures surrounding individuals in a society. To some extent, Wendt takes the 
argument a bit further, in my view, by including some material factors as part of the structures as 
well. He argues that social structures are still more important than material ones because the meaning 
and effects of the latter depend on the beliefs and expectations of the system, i.e. social structures.174 
While this is true – e.g. crude oil or natural gas wouldn’t be of any significance if people had not any 
use for it – it should not lead to neglecting material factors such as resources and the environment. 
Simply, fossil fuels are desired now because the world is what it is, and that is why the role of these 
fuels is so important in global energy policy. Furthermore, our use of fossil fuels is causing the climate 
change and harming the environment because that is what follows from such an intensive use of these 
fuels. That is why material factors too, socially constructed or not, form the structures within which 
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energy policy actors have to operate. Hence, it is essential to integrate them in the framework of this 
study and understand that surrounding structures have both social and material qualities. 
 
Second, there is a question of what do the actors know about the structures surrounding them. Scholars 
informed by social interactionism recognise that two people might assign different meanings to the 
same thing. This might be for whatever reason, but one possibility is because they have different 
information and experiences of the object. Therefore, it must be stressed that structures do not always 
appear the same or even similar to particular actors. Even if the actors have equal information 
available, they might still, and I suppose quite frequently do, interpret it in various ways. Further 
discussion on the topic of rational choice theory and its critiques about whether or not people, or 
states, always make rational decisions goes beyond the scope of the research question, but suffice it 
to say, in the context of this study, energy policy actors do not always make rational choices for they 
do not possess all the relevant information. For instance, many decisions, such as constructing a 
pipeline, will have consequences for several decades and it is not possible to know for certain that 
big expensive projects will be worthwhile still in 20 years or so. Another reason is that some choices 
which advance some of their interests may contradict some other goals, and it is not always easy, or 
possible at all, to calculate and compare gains and losses that could follow from a given decision. 
2.3. Susan Strange: four structures of power 
Susan Strange pointed out in 1988 that despite its significance, energy policy is vastly unexplored by 
any major academic discipline.175 She then outlined a research agenda from  an international political 
economy perspective, but still, there has been surprisingly little interest towards energy questions in 
IPE community.176 In my view, Strange’s model is close to, or at least in line with, structuration 
theory. Her goal is to synthesise politics and economics by scrutinising the structural effects of states 
on markets and, vice versa, of market forces on states.177 This should emphasise how difficult, and 
slightly irrational, it is to draw a clear distinction between economic and political power because they 
are necessarily linked. It is impossible, say, for a state to have political power if it has no purchasing 
power, command over production, or ability to mobilise capital and credit. Similarly, a company 
cannot have any economic power if no political authority offers it legal and physical security and is 
ready to sanction when those are violated.178  
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Instead, Strange suggests that there are two kinds of power in a political economy, namely structural 
power and relational power. According to her, scholars of international relations, especially realists, 
have conventionally described relational power as ‘the power of A to get to B to do something they 
would not otherwise do.’ Then again, she defines structural power as “the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political 
institutions, their economic enterprises and […] scientists have to operate.” In other words, structural 
power shapes the frameworks within which actors, states, people, and financial enterprises, relate to 
each other.179 As such, structural power counts far more than relational power because the relative 
power of an actor in a relationship increases only if it can determine the surrounding structure of the 
relationship all by itself. According to my interpretation, Strange argues that in very few occasions 
any actor is in this kind of position. If anyone rarely manages to unilaterally determine the 
surrounding structures of any relationship, it can hardly be the case that any actor could determine 
the actions which other actors might take in that relationship. This is fully in line with the idea of 
structuration as understood by Giddens and Wendt. 
 
It has already been said and repeated that structures do matter, but what are they in fact? Susan Strange 
argues that the world economy, in general, comprises of four power structures: security, production, 
finance, and knowledge. The security structure consists of the possibility of violence or conflict, 
whether internal or external, that threatens personal security. He who is in a position to offer 
protection can usually exercise power in other aspects than security affairs as well, such as 
administration of justice. If the perceived risk of violence grows, the actors will be ready to pay a 
bigger price for their protection. At the same time, though, the risk that the defence force will use its 
power to threaten itself those who it claims to protect will also become more likely.180 Those who 
feel themselves insecure might question the authority of the established order and pursue to install a 
new one. 
 
Equally fundamental question as who offers protection, concerns how production is organised in a 
community/state. At the time when Strange was writing her research, the Soviet Union and the 
Communist bloc in Europe, with their state ownership as the mean of production, were still in place. 
Thus, the differences in modes of production were perhaps more visible than today, but their 
significance is as great as ever even though much of the production mode based on state ownership 
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has ceased to exist. The production structure defines ‘who gets to decide what shall be produced, by 
whom, by what means, with what combination of land, labour, capital, and technology, and how each 
shall be rewarded.’181 Whoever has structural power over production can use it to defend their social 
and political power as well. And when an ever-increasing amount of goods and services are produced 
in response to the needs of the global economy, not the local community, the structural power over 
production – ‘the base for social and political changes’ – becomes extended far beyond the national 
frontiers.182 
 
Strange admits that of all structures, the finance one – the control of credit – is more present in 
advanced industrialised economies than in less developed countries or small tribal communities. 
When much of the production is for the producer’s own use and only things being bought or bartered 
are the ones that people cannot produce themselves, there is little need for credit. In last half century 
or so, the importance of finance structure has risen enormously and it is as vital as the security and 
production structure in today’s international economic relations.183 The control of credit implies the 
power to allow or deny other actors – people, companies, or states – to buy today and pay back 
tomorrow and hence influence markets for production. It also comprises the monetary system(s) 
which designate(s) the relative values of different currencies.184 It is crucial to keep in mind that credit 
does not equal money. What is invested in an advanced economy is credit rather than money. To 
invest money, one must accumulate capital, i.e. profits. If that had been the case, the world would not 
have seen any of the economic growth since the Second World War, Strange argues.185 In the high-
technology age, investments can only be financed through credit, because credit can be created. 
Whoever gains the confidence of others that they are capable of creating credit will control an 
economy.186 
 
A very special kind of structural power is that of knowledge, ideas, and beliefs. To have power in this 
structure, one must be able to acquire a kind of knowledge that is respected and sought by other actors. 
At the same time, to have any ‘competitive edge’ one must be able to deny others access to the desired 
knowledge and/or control the channels through which knowledge is communicated to those who have 
access to it. Power in the knowledge structure is more elusive and less easy to keep control over but 
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it is certainly helpful, if not essential, to reinforce other kinds of structural power. Strange notes that 
today – I would argue that for a long time in history – knowledge in technology is most sought after.187 
Technological superiority opens up several possibilities to exercise other forms of structural, and even 
relational, power. History is checkered with examples of how states and entities were able to dominate 
others because of their military might achieved by more advanced weaponry technology.188 There is 
also an interesting discussion going on about the significance of paradigm shift in economics. Some 
argue that in the last 80 years or so, changes in the production and finance structures, to use Strange’s 
vocabulary, have actually been preceded by paradigm shifts in academic economics – i.e. in the 
knowledge structure – which in turn were informed by the perceived limits of first Classical, then 
Keynesian, and now Neoclassical economics to explain and offer cure to a bad economic situation.189 
190 
 
In Strange’s view, these structures are universal and can be found in every society, as she illustrates 
in her story of castaway people who strand on a desert island.191 While this might be found 
controversial, I think it is reasonable to think that every community will have to make a decision 
about how they balance security, distribution of wealth, economic freedom, and justice, whether or 
not they conceptualise it this way or not. According to Strange, the security, production, finance, and 
knowledge structures are interacting with and affecting each other, but none necessarily dominate. 
Whoever (actor) has dominance in one or more structures (i.e., who offers protection against the 
threat of violence, who decides what shall be produced by what combination of land, labour, capital 
etc., who has control over money and credit, and who controls the channels through which desired 
knowledge is sought by) is able to change the range of choices open to others.192 To be more precise, 
what is essential is how do the actors perceive and interpret the structures surrounding them and how 
they aim to alter them on the basis of the picture they have formed. It should not be presumed that 
the structures appear to the actors ‘the way they are.’ Often times, each actor’s understanding of the 
surrounding policy environments is somewhat incomplete (perhaps because some other actor in a 
stronger position in the knowledge structure is denying them access to relevant information). That 
being said, this notion should not be exaggerated, for the surrounding structures, the world, does give 
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feedback if the actor’s presumptions are clearly wrong – if their decisions or policies simply do not 
work.193  
 
Susan Strange applies her framework to examine the development in the energy structure (secondary 
to the four ‘primary’ structures), specifically in the oil industry in the last hundred years. Instead of 
first scrutinising changes in the market conditions or policies of states and companies, and then trying 
to understand what changes occurred in the structure, the model suggests going the other way around. 
Starting with changes in the four structures, one can then ask about the spin-off effects on the policies 
of states, outcomes in international organisations, and the political economy of related markets.194 
One could object that all the author is doing is ‘going in at a different point on the circle.’ Strange 
notes that this is a legitimate observation, but insists that the four structures are less liable to sudden 
changes than policies or market conditions, and therefore it is better to start with the former.  
 
Strange found two major changes in the security structure. One was the redefinition of energy security 
following the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil price rise in 1973. It 
was now obvious that energy insecurity might be fatal for any state, including, or especially, to a 
superpower like the United States. The other change was, resulting from a change in knowledge 
structure, that the technology developed for atomic weaponry technology could be used to produce 
electricity. In the production structure, the biggest change occurred in the 1970s as well. Due to the 
fast economic growth in industrialised countries in the 1960s, OPEC was able to exploit the rapidly 
increasing market for oil. Eventually oil demand outran oil supply at 1972 prices, causing 
uncertainties in the market which have never fully ceased since. The financial structure has affected 
the oil industry in last hundred years, especially through the volatility of oil prices and national 
currencies, with the US dollar being of greatest significance. Not only has this accumulated 
uncertainties in the financial structure itself but also of energy supply and future prices. Another 
significant impact has been the credit. While credit makes many expensive investments possible, it 
has been strikingly more easily available to the big oil companies than to some of their customers. In 
regard to the knowledge structure, it is worth noting that originally and for quite long big oil 
companies and not anyone else, not even the states, had a monopoly of knowledge that was necessary 
to locate, drill, and sell oil.  As a result, governments did not really know how to tax the oil companies 
because they did not have enough knowledge about how much or how little they could ask for. The 
change in attitudes and beliefs after the first oil shock – that the supply of oil wasn’t inexhaustible 
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after all –, another notable change in the knowledge structure, translated into big changes everywhere 
in the energy structure. 
 
In this thesis, where the focus is not in the past but the future, this kind of framework could be used 
in analysing the material to uncover how the existing four structures of power seem to enable and 
restrict what choices the EU member states have in securing their supply of energy in the future, and 
moreover, how the member states aim to alter the structures with the means they have to get other 
actors of energy policy to make choices deemed desirable regarding the member states’ goals. Indeed, 
much of my final framework stems from Strange’s work but before formulating it I will discuss 
another valuable model which has guided me in my study. 
2.4. Aalto et al.: frames and dimensions 
Aalto et al.195 develop a model resembling, in my reading, that of Susan Strange. The authors have 
outlined their model in three articles of which I will concentrate on the most recent form, from 2014, 
in this subsection if not mentioned otherwise. In their model, Aalto et al. attempt to link the actors, 
their interests and wider schemata, the structural dimensions, and events with their consequences in 
Russian energy policy. They call this framework as ‘social structurationist model of energy policy 
formation.’196 Their idea of structuration comes mainly from Giddens and Wendt, an idea which I 
have decided to follow in this study. Although Aalto et al. are dealing with Russian energy policy, 
the authors note that their approach could be applied in other contexts as well. 
 
Aalto et al. purport that actors of energy policy are driven by their interests which are constantly 
influenced by social and material environments. Moreover, interests and their development are 
embedded in other social practices which may stretch far into history. To give an example one can 
point out the different logics which Russia seems to have in the gas sector considering ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ Europe. Western Europe, which never was under Russian control or within its sphere of 
influence, is considered as a lucrative economic zone from Moscow, one with which gas trade is 
indispensable for the country’s economy.197 Then again, Eastern Europe, much of which integrated 
with the West on the first chance they had, is not as crucial market for Russia. Some writers argue 
that this allows Russia to practice ‘neo-imperialism’ towards its former sphere of influence in the 
form of punishing the new EU member states for their hostility and creating hurdles to their 
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prosperity.198 Therefore, to better grasp the subtle and elusive nature of interests, the authors treat 
them as embedded within the wider schemata with which the actors operate. Schemata are cognitive 
devices which direct the actors in forming interests and assigning meaning to the surrounding 
structures, i.e. social and material environments.199 
 
The writers divide schemata into two types: frames and sense-making. The former, according to the 
typology of Erving Goffman200 implies rather distinct conditions for intentions and interaction. A 
frame can help an actor to decide how to coherently and comprehensively articulate his interests.201 
There are, of course, several frames which can either compete or complement each other. In the 
context of energy policy, these include a business frame, influence-seeking frame, energy security 
frame, and sustainability frame. The authors recognise that in Russian energy policy the first is 
common among state-owned companies, the second is widely associated with the state’s military 
ambitions, the third frame concerns mainly Russia’s European customers and the fourth one is more 
represented among Russia’s European partners such as Norwegian Statoil.202 The latter type of 
schemata refers to a situation where an actor lacks explicitly defined interests and is working to 
develop a coherent explanation of the state of affairs.203 As regards the purposes of this study, frame 
could be more useful tool than sense-making, for in my view situations where interests are difficult 
to define might occur especially after sudden changes in policy environments or major events. Such 
occasions are obviously extremely hard to predict in long-term national energy and climate strategies. 
 
The actors develop the schemata and the interests, derived thereof, by observing and assessing their 
policy environments which form the structure. Action takes place on the basis of these assessments. 
Furthermore, the outcome of these assessments depends on how much they know about the real 
content and character of the policy environments, i.e. how (ill-)informed they are.204 The authors call 
the respective structures dimensions which have both social and material qualities. These are 
conceptualised as the resource-economic, financial, institutional, and ecological dimensions.205 The 
first, forms the inherently material base of energy policy which should underwrite every aspect of it, 
the researchers argue.206 Indeed, any actor who doesn’t make proper account of the resource-
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economic dimension is inexorably going to make poor energy policy choices. The dimension consists 
of finite resources, the means and know-how of production, and physical geography which have an 
effect on the forms of transportation and distribution of energy.207 Concordant with the model of 
Susan Strange, which claims that whoever possesses a dominant position in one structure can 
significantly alter the range of choices for other actors, Aalto et al. argue that companies, energy 
industries, and consultancies have special expertise in resource-economic dimension. Therefore, the 
epistemic communities, consisting of experts working for firms, agencies, and organisations, are in a 
critical position to communicate the technological limitations and opportunities forward.208 
 
The second, the financial dimension includes all the transactions, investments, and capital needed to 
explore, produce, refine, and distribute energy. It also consists of pricing mechanisms for energy 
commodities, the exchange rate fluctuations, and size of both domestic and international energy 
markets. Typical actors who are in a central position in the financial dimension are banks, insurance 
corporations, big energy companies and international financial institutions. Because of the capital 
intensity of energy industry, some states with their export credit agencies also appear as important 
actors within this dimension.209 
 
The authors classified international agreements and institutions, informal norms and rules, decision-
making capacity, and international culture as part of the institutional dimension. In other words, the 
continuum is long and the content of this policy environment diverse and multifaceted. Hence, the 
outcome of energy policy may vary significantly depending on the surrounding institutional setting. 
States, regional blocs, their bureaucracies, and international/non-governmental organisations are the 
primary actors in the institutional dimension.210 
 
The effects the various energy policy activities have on the environment have in recent times given 
rise to the ecological dimension. It portrays the material nature of energy and the consequences of its 
usage in very different light than the resource-economic dimension. In addition to the environmental 
effects and the climatic consequences of energy production, transport, and use, the pressure to develop 
green renewable energy and the criticism of the conventional rationales of energy policy form the 
ecological dimension. Here the writers find various environmental organisations and government 
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agencies, activists, and experts to be the central actors. Despite the criticism towards the traditional 
energy policy structures, the actors within the ecological dimension pursue cooperation with the 
actors more represented in other dimensions in order to improve the stance of green energy.211 
 
Aalto et al. also add another level in their model, namely events. As their model goes, the actors 
express intentions, set goals, and develop interests on the basis of their schemata, which also guide 
them while acquiring knowledge from the surrounding structures, i.e. dimensions. They suggest that 
concentrating on the ‘biggest turning points’ or ‘key events’ is the best way to grasp the interaction, 
or ‘evolvement of processes’, between the actors, their schemata, and the policy environments, that 
is structuration to use Giddens’s term.212 According to the authors, neither Giddens nor Wendt 
considers events as part of their models, but I would argue that they are present in Strange’s 
framework. Starting by locating big pivotal changes in the four power structures, she is doing exactly 
the same as Aalto et al. when they assess key turning points. The authors understand events as 
‘sequences of occurrences that may result in the reformulation of energy policies.’213 Events may 
urge the actors to re-analyse the policy environments, which in turn might lead them to highlight 
different information within and across dimensions. Hence, the dimensions can reinforce or conflict 
one another.214 The Paris Agreement signed in December 2015 can be seen as a major event 
prompting the energy policy actors to give substantially more importance to the ecological dimension 
and thus reformulate the schemata accordingly. As a consequence, electric power companies may 
increase the share of renewables in their energy mix to remain competitive in the future. This example 
should highlight that events themselves do not make anything happen. Change requires action, as 
stressed among the critics of structuralism. Then again, active agency requires that actors assign 
meanings to things, that they possess tremendous amounts of socially structured knowledge, or, as 
Aalto et al. put it, that the actors have developed schemata in which their interests are embedded and 
which guide their actions. The authors conclude that ‘schemata are maintained or re-made in response 
to events.’215 Still, in line with their structurationist model, the writers stress that the effects of events 
will actualise only within the four structural dimensions.216 
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Aalto et al. apply their framework to study Russia’s energy relations in Europe and the Far East. They 
develop analytical narratives in the context of Nord Stream gas pipeline project, which directly 
connects Russia and Germany, and the Sakhalin-1 and 2 oil and gas projects. The authors found profit 
interests related to a wider business frame to be of primary importance for Russian energy policy 
actors. The energy superpower frame, which many realism-oriented writers217 see to be the dominant 
one in Russian energy policy, appears only amongst some of the actors, and even for them it is not as 
appealing as the business frame.218 Similar profit interests drive the actions of Russia’s energy 
partners and customers too. However, security of supply and transit interests stemming from the 
energy security frame were also found common among them, but these were structured in a different 
manner in Europe and the Far East, which the authors explain by pointing out the differences in 
resource-economic and institutional dimensions. Energy security was constructed in a very distinctive 
way amongst Russian energy policy actors; security of supply appeared not to be of significance, but 
rather security of demand/markets, which is an interest mostly embedded in the business frame.219 
2.5. Forming the analytical model for the study 
Having now discussed the works I mainly draw on in this study, it is time to formulate my own 
framework. As it is evident by now, the idea of structuration, as outlined by Anthony Giddens and 
Alexander Wendt, is the theoretical starting point in this dissertation. I’m of the opinion that society 
or, maybe more appropriately, community is surrounding individuals and entities at all levels, 
whether local, domestic, regional, or international. Many of those structures are social, but I wouldn’t 
say that is the case with all of them. Wendt, while admitting that there are material structures too, 
points out that the meaning and effects of the material structures depend on the beliefs and 
expectations defined in the social ones.220 Even that definition might go too far in my view. Think for 
example that a quarry has a wastewater problem and as a result local groundwater gets contaminated, 
and the local people, cattle, agriculture, wildlife, and vegetation cannot use the water anymore without 
getting poisoned. Is the rapidly rising need to solve the problem and prevent it happening again 
socially constructed? The need to have clean freshwater is essentially biological and thus ‘material’. 
However, this is not the time or place to engage in metatheoretical debate about the ontological 
composition of the world. Suffice it to say that the structures around energy policy actors are both 
social and material in kind.  
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Hence, both the (intended) actions of the EU member states concerned in this study, Denmark and 
Finland, and the policy environments within which they operate shall be of significance in the 
analysis. Other actors of Danish and Finnish energy policy, such as the EU, local governments, 
companies etc., surely have an important, both enabling and restrictive, role in national energy policy 
formation but assessing those parties’ own goals and means to reach them is outside of the scope of 
this research project. Such a structuration-oriented study obviously could be conducted where the 
focus would be on several, say, the most important, actors and their interests and intentions in one 
country’s energy policy. As it happens, Aalto et al. do just this kind of analysis.221 However, in this 
dissertation I suggest a different kind of approach wherein only one actor’s – or two since the analysis 
covers two different energy policies – preferences and policy choices are under the lens. I do argue 
that such an approach is compatible with the structuration theory, for, from the point of view of the 
states, the other actors can be seen as part of the structure who have an effect on the states’ range of 
policy choices and whom the states try to influence, control, and steer. From this perspective, other 
entities than the sates in question can, and should be, taken into account in this thesis, too, but as ‘part 
of the structure’, not as individual actors. Treating other relevant actors as part of the structures does 
not mean that they would have to act in a predetermined manner in accordance with the best 
knowledge they can acquire about the surrounding structures, nor does the state in question have to 
assume so. If anything, it merely underlines the fact that no individual, whether a state, a company, 
or a human-being, lives in a vacuum and can make of the reality whatever they desire once they have 
enough information of the world. Other actors necessarily limit and direct any individual’s 
expectations and range of choices, but the individual can also influence the others. As already 
mentioned, without the others possessing vast amount of social knowledge and repeatedly acting on 
the basis of it, the whole idea of social structures would vanish. 
 
I find both the works of Strange222 and Aalto et al. stimulating, and they contain valuable elements 
and guidance for constructing a decent framework for many studies. Some modifications are still in 
place, which should be expected – copying a ready framework is rather dubious anyway. Though 
there is much in common in the works of the abovementioned scholars, I find the latter more 
sophisticated and adjusted for energy policy research in particular. After all, Strange’s model depicts 
general structures of the whole global political economy, although she herself applies it to the energy 
sector as well – a rare case in her time and for decades to come. But in my view Strange primarily 
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attempts to theorise how the global political economy functions, i.e. what kind of forces are crucial 
in restricting and enabling what the actors can make of it. Moreover, the concept of power is in the 
core of Strange’s work. The focus of this comparative case study is the actors’ goals and their 
interpretations of the surrounding policy environment, and as such power and all the widely varying 
theorisation related to it is not very central for this paper. A study concentrating purely on, say, how 
much the actors’ can possibly alter the surrounding structure in their favour could benefit more of the 
power aspects of Strange’s model. 
 
Then again, in my interpretation Aalto et al. use their analytical model to scrutinise the formation of 
energy policy, i.e. how the involved parties act, and what kind of interests drive them forward. This 
is closer to the research task of this study. However, my intention is not that much to grasp the 
interests (that seems to be the aim in Aalto et al.’s approach) which motivate Denmark and Finland 
in their energy policies, but to examine how the states in question are trying to combine security of 
supply with energy targets and other principles in energy policy (i.e. competitiveness and 
sustainability), and as the latter part of the research question goes, why are they pursuing security of 
supply in the manner they have outlined in their national energy and climate strategies? 
 
I strongly think that the skills, techniques, and know-how, embedded in the knowledge structure in 
Strange’s model, must be seen as part of the energy policy structures, for they have a big part in 
forming the range of choices the energy policy actors can make. Indeed, Strange herself argues that 
the kind of knowledge most sought after nowadays is technology.223 That is why I’m of the opinion 
that technology, including the tools and appliances that are necessary in all the stages of energy 
production, transmission, and consumption, should be seen as one separate policy environment. Aalto 
et al. include the technology needed for the extraction, refinement, and transportation of energy in 
their resource-economic dimension,224 but I don’t think this gives sufficient account to it. Moreover, 
technology-related issues aren’t necessarily linked with resources or economics, but possibly with 
the environment too, and the spread of devices and technological know-how have substantial effects 
for affairs which in Aalto et al.’s model are seen as part of the financial and the institutional 
dimension. 
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Aalto et al. suggested adding ‘events’ as another level in the analytical model.225 They argued that 
the interaction between the actors, their schemata, and the policy environments can be grasped 
through analysing the key turning points in energy policy. In fact, Strange uses similar kind of method 
by examining the biggest changes that have occurred in the four primary power structures, and then 
scrutinises their implications for the secondary power structures, such as energy.226 Undoubtedly, 
tracking events, understood as external shocks which may alter both the surrounding structures of 
energy policy and the actors’ preferences in the respective field, is a useful tool in forming the big 
picture of historical development, whether recent or distant. But it is not really a suitable tool for the 
purposes of this study, since this research focuses on the future, not the past, and, clearly, no upcoming 
events can be anticipated. However, the member states concerned, Denmark and Finland, most likely 
try to hasten the kind of future development they prefer, and possibly even build their strategies on 
assumptions they expect to realise (these could include, for instance, major progress in electricity 
storage technologies or significant increase in EU-wide emission allowance price, which is currently 
at €4.8 a tonne of carbon dioxide),227 albeit their influence can vary greatly between different policy 
phenomena. Therefore, although not very fruitful tool for this paper, the importance of ‘events’ in 
shaking policy environments must be kept in mind, for a lot of dynamics of energy policy field can 
be understood through them. 
 
As for the policy environments within which Denmark and Finland operate in their energy policy, I 
shall use similar kind of conceptualisation than those developed by Strange and Aalto et al. The policy 
environments surely could be classified in various ways but two principles are worthy to follow in 
forming any analytical model. First, there should be reasonable amount of categories so that each 
dimension gets covered – with no relevant structures left out or unnecessarily combined together. 
Second, categories shouldn’t be too numerous, for it would merely undermine the analysis by making 
it messy, and put the researcher’s ability to encapsulate the most important factors behind a 
phenomenon, no matter how complicated, into question.  I would argue that the policy environments 
can be classified in five categories without compromising the fluency with the analysis. In my 
theoretical framework the policy environments of energy policy consist of the resource, the financial, 
the institutional, the environmental, and the technology structure. For analytical purposes the different 
structures are to be kept apart, even though in reality they, obviously, relate to each other in several 
different ways – possibly by depending on each other (e.g. to utilise any resources one must have 
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sufficient capital and adequate technology at hand) or by contradicting one another (decarbonising 
the economy comes at a cost, though the cost of not decarbonising is even bigger in the long-term).228 
My argument is that Denmark and Finland, naturally, aspire to fulfil their goals and preferences in 
energy policy, including those regarding security of supply. They act within the limits of the 
(observed) structures, and whether they make a certain choice or not depends on whether they find it 
possible within those structures. Therefore, the states’ ‘worldviews’, their assessments of the 
surrounding energy policy environments can be understood by examining their goals and actual 
policies in the energy sector. 
 
 By the resource structure I mean the distribution of resources which the states can access, 
domestically or through imports, and use to satisfy their energy needs (i.e. for transport fuels, 
electricity, heating etc.). These resources include not only hydrocarbons, uranium, or biomass 
such as woodchips or (agricultural) waste, but also renewables, e.g. wind and solar resources. 
The resources available and the infrastructure of the economy, industry, housing, and transport 
sector set the material foundation and range for any energy policy, i.e. what kind of energy 
can be used and/or is needed, to what end, and in what extent. 
 I define the financial structure to include the price of different energy sources, the 
employment of related sectors of the economy, and all the financial transactions, e.g. 
investments, subsidies, and the EU emission trading scheme, needed to extract, refine, 
transmit, and consume energy. The financial structure can set some limits for energy policy, 
or at least make some options to look undesirable, but it can also grant incentives for the kind 
of decision-making that forwards the actor’s policy goals. 
 The institutional structure consists of formal entities, such as local and regional governments, 
other states, supranational unions (the EU), intergovernmental organisations, companies, non-
governmental organisations, and epistemic communities. I also count in informal institutions, 
including customs and norms. The institutional structure can oblige, advise, discourage, or 
restrict the actor’s energy policy. Depending on the actor’s position, the (observed) structure 
may be beneficial or disadvantageous for the actor. Consider, for example, the global legally 
binding climate agreement that was reached. States whose economy is highly dependent on 
fossil fuels will struggle whereas countries that have started decarbonisation of their 
economies will gain a competitive edge. 
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 The environmental structure comprises of all the segments of the environment: soil and other 
layers of lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, and biosphere. It is affected in various ways 
by energy production and consumption. Those effects can be felt either on local, regional, or 
global level. Experienced or estimated alteration of the environmental structure can direct the 
policy-making in energy affairs sometimes directly, e.g. through groundwater contamination, 
but more often, I’d argue, indirectly through numerous mechanisms which relate to changes 
in other structures as well (e.g. a technological breakthrough which makes extracting solar 
power more cost-efficient than before allowing to shut down environmentally harmful coal 
mines when they aren’t needed anymore). 
 Technology, and the importance of it, could perhaps be best appreciated as one of the factors 
of production, among labour, capital, land, and energy.229 I define the technology structure to 
enclose all the tools, techniques, skills, methods, processes, and appliances available for 
energy production and consumption. I also count in technologies that are in development 
stage, e.g. carbon capture and storage, because they, too, can have an impact on actor’s 
assessments of (future) energy policy environments. The technology structure is affiliated 
with all the other structures very deeply and development in it can have profound, even 
revolutionary effects on not only the other energy policy environments but also the whole 
society, as the introduction of steam engine or nuclear power illustrates, just to give a couple 
of examples. 
 
Next I will lay out the methodology, comparative case study, which I am going to use in the analysis. 
After that, I will present my findings in the analysis which I have divided into three subsections. In 
the first, I will present in detail the material I have used in this study. The second subsection answers 
to the research questions of how and why as regards Denmark, and the third with regard to Finland. 
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3. Methodology: A comparative case study approach 
3.1. The role of method in the research setting 
The methodological choices in any study should not concern merely the data acquisition and technical 
execution of the study. They are, or at least they should be, closely linked with the (meta-)theoretical 
premises upon which the researcher builds the study.230 Chosen methods should advise the reader 
how the author intends to draw conclusions from the data and reflect his ontological and 
epistemological presumptions. Moreover, the methodological choices in any work should also be fit 
with the (meta-)theories, and their typology and particular aspect of the world, contained in the 
literature which the work is grounded.231 Method should be tool with which to bind the empirical and 
theoretical perceptions and guide the scholar to draw meaningful conclusions from the myriad of 
data.232  If there is a gap between the ontological and epistemological presumptions between the 
theory and method, then obviously the researcher must change their methodological approach or 
ground their work in different vocabulary and worldviews, in a word, theories. 
 
Different meanings are constantly being attached to the method itself among International Relations 
scholars. This is due to largely diverging research settings everywhere in social sciences, originating 
from philosophical debates about the world’s composition and humans’ abilities to gain knowledge 
of it. Much has been written about the ‘contemporary’ polarisation between ‘positivists’ and ‘post-
modernists’.233 234 Numerous categories could be added between these two extremes, but suffice it to 
say that few positivists are advocates of such a strict form of scientific realism which insists that 
humans are capable of grasping the observable world ‘as it is’ without limitations or distortions from 
our senses or concepts.235 Likewise, there are few post-modernists who would not reject extreme 
relativism.236 Still, the wide variety of methods in International Relations – only a glance into the 
contents of a methodology textbook will illustrate just how many approaches with their various forms 
there are237 – reflects the underlying ontological and epistemological differences among IR scholars. 
These differences legitimately lead researchers to formulate their study agendas in a specific manner. 
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Some pursue to explain a certain phenomenon while the others are keener to add understanding of it. 
Furthermore, some have argued that there are two kinds of the former: causal and constitutive 
explanations.238 Probably the most common way to characterise research agendas is to deal them into 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. All these divisions, undoubtedly they could be categorised 
in many other ways too, reflect that within different methodological approaches, the meaning and 
function of the method varies. Some approaches, which might be quantitatively oriented or are 
advocates of critical realism, such as historical analysis, see method as a tool which, if properly used 
with right kind of data, provides decent explanations for how certain things have occurred in the 
world.239 Qualitative approaches like feminist ethnography and rhetorical analysis utilise method 
more as a mean with which to make sensible accounts of affairs.240 241 Here the question of 
generalisation is given two-folded answers.242  
 
It is very difficult to provide an exhaustive summary, especially in a limited space like this, about 
how should a method be chosen, how is it ‘formed’, and how is it ‘used’. But it is not a particularly 
complicated process either. First, methods can do different things and therefore the research question 
must be answerable with the chosen method. Second, the method should reflect the (meta-)theoretical 
premises, i.e. the general conceptualisation of the world, which form the basis for the study. Discourse 
analysis of policy papers does not make sense if language is not even included as a form of observable 
behaviour. The third point concerns operationalisation; what to look at, what material should one 
gather, and in what extent? Depending on the array, level, and scope of the study, not all methods are 
equally fit. Finally, each scholar must work reflecting the validity and quality of the study, and the 
implications which might follow from their own position and the looping effects their publications 
might have (that is, while studying ‘the reality’ of the social world, in a way social scientists also end 
up (re-)creating the reality).243 
 
A master’s dissertation is not the place to engage in a metatheoretical debate much more deeply, not 
to mention it is not expected in this kind of paper. However, before discussing the selected 
methodological approach for this study, my own ontological and epistemological assumptions in this 
work need to be made clear for the reader. This should provide him now a more comprehensive 
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picture of the research agenda and later on its part justify the chosen method and its compatibility 
with the theoretical and empirical perceptions. To start with ontology, my view is in accordance with 
all forms of scientific realism, and common sense. The physical world around us is independent of 
the mind and concepts of people. The world consists of material, but social structures can be, and 
frequently are, just as real, constraining, and enabling for each individual as the material structures. 
There are, especially within Foreign Policy Analysis, neurobiological, behaviour genetics, and such 
approaches which aim to explain some of the phenomena within the sphere of international relations 
with the help of natural sciences, namely physics in the very end. I do not follow such reductive 
materialism, which still remains mostly a philosophical question. However, I am not convinced, to 
say the least, that, say, analysing the causes behind a foreign policy choice is most meaningful in the 
level of particle physics. Therefore, ideas matter, in fact often more than the material setting, for 
often, though not always, the relevance of the latter depends on what kind of meanings a person or 
people have assigned to it. But the world is not ideas all the way down, as the common expression 
goes. 
 
As for epistemology, I’m an advocate of critical realism. By this I mean, that our minds and language 
can refer to the physical world through careful, accurate, and repeatedly tested theories even when it 
is not directly observable. This is not to say that mind and language can hook on to the world from 
the perspective of some almighty. By default, our perceptions of the world are ‘merely’ aspects of it, 
and they are necessarily limited and distorted by our finite senses and selective concepts. However, 
the right conclusion of this is not that each interpretation is just as valid and invalid as the others. The 
pragmatists’ account which goes that truth must be useful-to-believe makes sense. I do not fully 
endorse the argument, but it highlights the fact that the world constantly gives us feedback about our 
actions. If people can build up applications to improve the quality of their lives, and it turns out that 
they can successfully use them in the long-term, then the people must have understood something 
about the laws of nature and physics. There is a good reason why trial and error is a fundamental 
problem solving method, if we only can learn from our mistakes, that is, the feedback the world gives 
us. 
3.2. Comparative case study 
Case study research is used in many academic disciplines and other situations. In addition to political 
science, it is fairly common in psychology, sociology, management studies, public administration 
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research, and city and regional planning.244 Analysis of cases has been applied to so many studies, 
both quantitative and qualitative, that some scholars like Audie Klotz have questioned the common 
treatment of case study as a single ‘method’ at all.245 According to her, it should be seen as part of 
research design since all kinds of methodological tools can be employed in analysing a single or 
several cases.246 247 Audie argues, that to decide the applicable case study research set for any work, 
scholars need to start from thinking about what are the key concepts which make the case what it is 
and what are the qualities that should be compared? If the object of the study is a state, which it often 
is, then the case is a state, but a case of what?248 After clarifying the key questions and concepts, 
scholars must map the universe of possible cases, and choose how many cases are dealt with in the 
analysis. Finally, they must decide which logic of comparison is used to analyse the selected cases.249 
What results is that there is either a single case, a pair of them, or more than two cases (but Klotz 
argue that there shouldn’t be too many). Each setting has its own features and even though several 
tools could be used in the analysis, the logic of these three case studies is different in relation to each 
other. 
 
However, stating that different case studies should be analysed with different means is doing nothing 
but saying the obvious, and leaves the question of how should the analysis be conducted completely 
unanswered. Even Klotz does not discuss much about this in the texts I have referred to above. 
Further, I do not find it very productive to deny case study the status of a method on the basis that its 
implementation practices vary so significantly. Can’t this be said about many other methodological 
traditions as well, like, say, discourse analysis? It has been suggested by scholars within feminist 
methodology and rhetorical analysis as well.250 251 Wouldn’t it be more fruitful to think that there are 
different kinds of case study strategies which use varying sources of evidence and modes of analysis 
but they all have a common definition? 
 
Robert Yin does just this. I shall use his definition of case study in this work. In the words of Yin: 
 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
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 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.252 
 
Based on Yin’s definition, this study’s research agenda fulfil the criteria for case study. 
Transformation of two states’ energy-mix through strategic planning is a contemporary, empirical 
phenomenon which content and qualities cannot be self-evidently driven from the context, i.e. the 
surrounding structures. Furthermore, there is a fit between the research questions of this work and 
case study strategy, for how and why questions are characteristic for a case study. They are typical 
for experiment and historical analysis, but in social sciences the former is mostly applicable in 
psychology and microsociology, and the latter obviously concentrates on already occurred events.253 
 
Yin argues that case studies, just like many other research approaches, can be either exploratory, 
descriptive, or explanatory. Still, questions of how and why typically lead to more explanatory 
strategy because such questions address operational links which need to be traced over time – 
frequencies or incidences are not as significant.254 An example of an explanatory case study is 
Graham Allison’s attempt to explain the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.255 In Allison’s work 
there is a single case, the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the 
Soviet decision to place offensive missiles in Cuba. Allison suggests three theories to explain the 
course of events and answers three key why questions. By comparing each theory with the evidence, 
he then presents the best explanation not only for the Cuban crisis but for the type of crisis which the 
former is an example of. 
 
My research strategy is close to the one Allison has applied in his study but instead of formulating 
several competing theories, I have ‘only’ one theory which consists of five separate, yet linked, 
dimensions – as I have laid out above. Summing up how two states are pursuing their security of 
supply is not difficult in the light of their energy and climate strategies, but explaining why they are 
doing it just that way and not some other requires similar approach than what Allison used in his 
work. I believe that the states in question are committed to reaching their energy and climate goals 
but they want to do it as cost effectively as possible and without compromising, too much, the secure 
supply of energy.256 That is why the path they choose in their strategies, must reflect their 
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interpretations of the surrounding structures which allow them to take such a route to meet their goals. 
It would not make much sense to pursue goals which they deem impossible to reach with the selected 
means or due to the unfavourable policy environment. This way, the states’ ‘worldviews’, their 
interpretation of the surrounding structures, which I have theorised in the previous section, can be 
explained. In my view, this can be done by looking at: (1) the policy goals and choices the 
governments are pledging to make or are currently conducting; (2) the reasoning behind those 
decisions; and (3) the given room for alteration of goals if possible, needed, or necessary. The 
intention is not to explore which one of the five dimensions seems to count the most, but to explain 
how each of the structures appears as a part of the energy policy environment from the perspective of 
states. 
 
Since there are two separate cases – in the ‘universe’ of states, or, probably more appropriately, EU 
states257 – it makes my methodological approach a multiple-case study. But I shall call it a 
comparative case study, for in the field of political science that has been the generic term for long.258 
259 A commonly raised concern about case studies, whether single or comparative, is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalisation – the same goes, of course, with single experiments. To 
become facts they have to be successfully repeated multiple times under different conditions.260 Some 
scholars argue that although case studies might offer ‘only’ a detailed snapshot of a given 
phenomenon, they reveal something of the wider social structures at the same time.261 That depends 
where the snapshot was taken, but it is not the idea to view a case as ‘a sample’ in the same way as 
an experiment. After all, case studies might be generalisable, not directly to any experimentees such 
as an individual or a group, but to theoretical propositions. A social scientist pursuing case study 
strategy attempts to expand and generalise theories.262 Yin calls it analytic generalisation, in contrast 
to statistical generalisation, which is usually the goal in experimental approaches. Just as Graham 
                                                 
that have followed, and, in harsher forms, will continue to do so according to scientists, if our energy systems are not 
transformed? So even if the states do not bother themselves a bit about the energy and climate goals, which I certainly do 
not believe, that, too, would be explainable within the outlined research setting. 
257 In Audie Klotz’s terms, in this study an EU member state is a case of an entity which has major, but not sole, authority 
to design and conduct energy policy (energy production and consumption, energy export/import, energy transmission, 
efficiency regulations, incentives, taxation, legislation etc.) within particular geographical area. Comparing an EU state 
with a non-EU state might prove problematic, for some of the authority which the latter possesses lies in the hands of 
supranational EU institutions in the case of the former. But comparing two EU countries shouldn’t require a 
comprehensive account because without any special exemptions the authority the states have is exactly the same. 
258 George 1979. 
259 Lijphart 1975. 
260 Yin 1994, 10. 
261 Gerring 2007. 
262 Yin 1994, 10. 
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Allison strived for creating an explanatory model for power politics in crisis situation, this paper tries 
to formulate a model which can be used in other contexts of (national) energy policy planning too.  
54 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. The material 
This work’s primary material consists of Danish and Finnish short-, medium- and long-term energy 
and climate strategies. In Denmark, the long-term strategy goes under the name of Energy Strategy 
2050: from coal and gas to green energy. Its Finnish counterpart is named Energy and Climate 
Roadmap 2050. The former was published in 2011 and the latter in 2014. Both are official government 
strategies and thus the countries in question are committed to reaching the goals outlined in their 
respective documents, at least until they are officially overruled or replaced by new strategies. It is 
worth to note, of course, that the national energy and climate strategies are prepared by ministries 
which have different areas of responsibility. In Denmark, energy policy affairs are under the Ministry 
of Energy, Utilities and Climate, in contrast to Finland where the responsible ministry is that of 
Employment and the Economy. Undoubtedly this may have an effect on which experts and lobbyists 
are heard, and how much, in the preparation, and what kinds of aspects receive the most attention in 
the papers. Indeed, the mere fact that the responsible ministries with their underlying agencies may 
have diverging interests could partially explain why these two states have interpreted the energy 
policy environment differently on official level. However, evaluating which authority, industry, 
organisation, or political party has left the biggest mark in national energy and climate strategies 
would be a subject for a completely another study. Therefore, I will have to take the national energy 
and climate strategies ‘as given’ in a sense that whoever gets to define them, they are officially 
accepted government documents and as such represent the will of the respective governments until 
the strategies are overruled or replaced. 
 
Both the Danish Energy Strategy 2050 and the Finnish Energy and Climate Roadmap 2050 are, 
accordingly to their names, future-oriented papers embedded with different scenarios. Danish Climate 
Policy Plan (from 2013) and Finnish National Energy and Climate Strategy (from 2013) are much 
more specific government documents covering the binding targets and initiatives for the short- and 
medium-term, and current and further measures needed to achieve those energy and climate goals. In 
addition, there are other government documents, such as energy policy reports and legislative 
publications, which both establish a framework for short-term energy policy and outline the paths the 
countries will take in medium- and long-term. The Danish documents include an Energy Agreement 
which came into effect in March 2012, a publication called Our Future Energy from 2011, which 
paved the way for the agreement, and Energy policy report 2013. The Finnish government, which 
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was formed in May last year, has listed “bioeconomy and clean solutions” as part of its strategic 
government programme, and therefore this paper and other relevant publications concerning so called 
key projects in energy policy are included in the material. The lengths of these documents vary 
between 5 and 75 pages, and, in total, the primary material consists of about 300 pages. 
4.2. Denmark – fossil fuel independency by 2050 
4.2.1. How? From expansion of wind power to energy efficiency 
The short answer to the question of how is Denmark securing its energy supply in the short-, medium- 
and long-term is through a significant increase in renewable energy production and various energy 
efficiency improvements. Its energy and climate strategies are not, however, and quite 
understandably, merely expressions of what have already been decided, but reflect a long-term need 
for new initiatives and room for flexibility. Therefore, the long answer is nuanced and in some 
respects uncertain. 
 
The erstwhile governments’263 strategies and other documents analysed in this study were published 
between 2011 and 2013. Already within two years the governments made notable changes which will 
accelerate the transition of Danish energy system. To give an example, with the initiatives of the 
Energy Agreement of 2012, the greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 34% in 2020 in 
relation to 1990, but the Climate Policy Plan published in the next year introduced a set of additional 
measures which would allow cutting the emissions by 40% in 2020 compared to the 1990 level. Some 
of the short-term goals for the transition period between today and 2020 vary, but the long-term goal 
of completely fossil fuel independent Denmark is clearly stated in all documents. 
 
The aim to cover half of electricity consumption by wind power in 2020 was first outlined in Our 
Future Energy, which paved the way for the Energy Agreement of 2012. In the same document, the 
government also pledged to phase out the use of coal in Danish power plants by 2030. In the same 
year, oil burners used for heating and electricity production are also to be phased out. The electricity 
and heat supply are to be covered fully by renewables in 2035, and other remaining sectors such as 
transport and industry, i.e. all primary energy supply, in 2050. Achieving these goals would still leave 
some emissions emerging from agriculture and, for instance, from old landfills, but since the absolute 
majority of Danish greenhouse gas emissions originate from the energy sector and transport, Denmark 
                                                 
263 Hereafter in all sections of the analysis, by ‘the government’ I refer to the government in power at the time. 
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would be able to reach the EU long-term target of 80–95% emission reduction in 2050 in relation to 
1990. 
 
The Danish government attempts to create a framework which enables the significant increase of 
renewable energy in energy consumption. These measures include, for example, preferential 
treatment in combined heat and power (CHP) production (which is a very large sector in Denmark), 
subsidies, and an option to use the energy generated in a biogas plant for the plant’s own processes 
or to sell it to the highest bidder. Additionally, large-scale CHP plants using biomass were previously 
limited by non-profit regulation, but the Energy Strategy in 2011 strove to change this provision and 
allow producers and consumers of CHP to agree on a price. Effectively this means that the supplier 
and buyer can share the tax benefits of switching to renewable energy. 
 
As already mentioned, one of the main means Denmark will use to reach its targets is through 
expansion of their capacity to produce renewable energy. In 2009, the share of renewables in 
electricity production was 29%, and wind power alone accounted for 19%. The government has 
accepted and adopted several measures which increased the share of wind power more than twofold 
in five years.264 In 2012, the government initiated the expansion of offshore wind power capacity by 
1,000 MW by 2020 – this amount is almost exactly the same as the whole Finnish wind power 
capacity in 2015. Furthermore, new nearshore wind turbines with the combined capacity of 500 MW 
will be built, and new land-use planning tools will encourage a net increase of 500 MW in onshore 
wind power capacity by 2020. The government estimates that these measures will ensure that more 
than 50% of electricity production will be covered by wind power in 2020 and roughly two-thirds in 
2030. The Danish government sees that it can easily increase the capacity of wind turbines in the sea 
due to plentiful space and favourable conditions. However, the government’s view is that in a densely 
populated country like Denmark, land-use and public acceptance do not leave as much leeway to 
substantially increase wind farms on land. Therefore, onshore wind power production can mainly be 
increased by upgrading the existing turbines to more efficient ones at the point when they reach the 
end of their life spans. As the state aims to electrify its whole energy system by 2050, it has provided 
funding – e.g. worth of DKK 105 million (€14 million) as part of the Energy Agreement 2012 – to 
research, development, and demonstration of technological solutions related to electricity and heat 
production, since problems like the volatility of wind power production cannot be solved by plainly 
increasing the capacity. The government recognises that technological advances in energy storage of 
                                                 
264 Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate 2015, ref. Worldwatch Institute Europe. 
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wind power, are needed to optimise the consistence between wind power production, its transmission, 
and electricity consumption. 
 
As for renewable energy, in general, the Danish goal outlined in 2011 aimed to cover 33% of final 
energy consumption with renewables in 2020. This was three percentage points higher than the target 
agreed earlier on EU level. However, the 2012 Energy Agreement increased this target to 35%. The 
share of electricity sector is relatively small in primary energy consumption in Denmark, about one-
sixth,265 and outside of the respective sector, solid biomass accounts for the majority of renewable 
energy consumption in Denmark.266 The government believes that large amounts of coal and natural 
gas can be replaced cost-effectively by biomass already in the short-term through the conversion of 
large- and small-scale power plants. In addition to biomass, the Danish government wants to increase 
the use of biogas and biofuels. Much of the expansion of biogas production comes from livestock 
manure, of which up to 50% are to be exploited for energy purposes by 2020. Biogas can be used to 
replace all fossil fuels, oil, coal, and natural gas, but it is especially useful in phasing out the latter 
because it can be utilised in an already existing grid. Denmark also expects to reach the 10% target 
for biofuels in transport by 2020. In the long-term however, the government worries that the rising 
demand of biomass resources might put their sufficiency under question and thus raise prices and put 
pressure on security of supply. On the other hand, the government anticipates that the technologies 
used in production of biomass will develop, which will also lower the price of energy produced from 
biomass. Then again, biofuels do not factor much in Danish medium- and long-term planning of 
energy system. This is because the policymakers estimated that fossil fuel independency in transport 
will probably have to be based on more electric power, since electric motors are far more energy 
efficient than combustion engines, and for electrification of the energy system is the state’s main aim. 
Second generation biofuels made from residues and waste, in contrast to first generation biofuels 
derived from edible sources, may play an important role only for freight and aviation. Contrary to 
biofuels, biogas has an important role in securing supply of energy in the long-term too, for it reduces 
emissions from agriculture – and benefits aquatic environment and air quality –, which is an important 
mean in sharing the burden of climate commitments with all sectors of society. 
 
Danish policymakers view carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a relevant technology in the long-
term. The idea in the technology is that a power plant equipped with CCS can, presumably, capture 
approximately 90% of the carbon dioxide produced while burning coal, and the CO2 is then stored in 
                                                 
265 IEA 2015, 50. 
266 See for instance Danish Government 2011a, 50. 
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liquid or solid form to a site wherefrom it cannot escape to the atmosphere. For now, the Danish 
government sees that the technology is not commercially viable, but it does not overrule the 
possibility that CCS could be part of Danish energy system at a later date. If it becomes mature, then 
the use of coal will be justified according to the strategies, but CCS could also be combined with 
biomass to reduce CO2 emission to negative, resulting in a situation where carbon dioxide would be 
withdrawn from the atmosphere. Solar and wave energy could also provide valuable supplements to 
wind and biomass in the long-term, specifically because they are productive at different times than 
the former, which would decrease pressure to develop energy storage solutions. However, the Danish 
energy and climate strategies take a different stance towards these technologies. They affirm several 
times that the state is ready to continue supporting research, development, and demonstration of the 
solar and wave energy technologies, but rarely mention the state’s contribution to supporting CCS 
technology. Only if a breakthrough within it is reached internationally will the state reconsider the 
suitability of CCS for Danish energy system. 
 
Ramping up renewable energy production is one way the Danish government pursues to secure its 
energy supply, which is currently very high, for at the time of writing the strategies, Denmark was a 
net exporter of energy. But the strategies convey a clear message that it is disproportionally expensive 
to expand energy production into renewables without reducing energy consumption, i.e. demand for 
energy, at the same time. Therefore, increasing energy efficiency is the other core of Danish energy 
strategies. Electrification of the energy system is a big part of this because it is in itself an efficiency 
improvement both at the consumption and at the production side (oil and gas furnaces and boilers, 
combustion engines, and coal plants are more inefficient than applications and devices which use 
electricity). In the short-term, district and individual heating and industrial processes are steered 
towards electrification, for they can be run with heat pumps. As the share of electricity in all primary 
energy grows, the government attempts to make electricity consumption more flexible with an 
intelligent system, also known as smart grid technologies, enabling customers to react with the 
changing conditions of production; for example, reducing their consumption of electricity when the 
demand, and thus price, is high. The government sees the electrification of transport more as a 
medium- and long-term goal, for currently new technological advances are required to make large-
scale, electrified transport technologically feasible and competitive in economic terms. The Danish 
government pushes the EU for more intensive research and development in this field. In its own right, 
the government has guaranteed tax exemptions for electric cars and is building a recharge station 
network for electrified cars. 
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The 20th century was largely driven by access to cheap and plentiful coal, oil and gas. In the 21st 
century we will have to find other means of satisfying our energy needs.267 
 
As part of the efficiency measures, the Energy Agreement also ruled that no new oil- or gas-fired 
boilers can be installed to new buildings from 2013 onwards. Replacing oil-fired burners with new 
ones in existing buildings is not possible starting from 2016, with an exception for areas which are 
not covered by district heating or natural gas grid. Moreover, the energy companies had been targeted 
by energy saving obligations in 2010–2012. These included, for instance, installations of energy 
efficient equipment and building refurbishments, and they can be realised by, for example, offering 
subsidies. The obligations were increased in 2013–2014, and again in 2015–2020. This translates to 
2.6% increase in energy savings in final energy consumption (excluding transport) in relation to the 
2010 level in 2013–2014. In 2015–2020, the savings will have to rise to a yearly 2.9%. In contrast, 
the EU’s directive on energy efficiency requires an annual reduction of 1.5% of 2010 final energy 
consumption (excluding transport) up to 2020. 
 
The Danish government is also working on stricter requirements for appliances and products in terms 
of energy efficiency. Because it cannot be done nationally, the government pursues this agenda on 
EU level. It also prepares a strategy to make sure that all new building components meet efficiency 
requirements and that efficiency improvements (additional insulation, windows that reduce air 
leakage, more efficient form of heating etc.) are carried out while renovating existing buildings. The 
public sector, although having relatively limited energy consumption, will meet these standards at a 
fast pace. 
 
Finally, although Denmark has been a net exporter of energy for years, it does not arguably strive for 
absolute energy independence in the long-term. Instead of building an extensive capacity of 
renewable energy which could meet the country’s energy demand in all occasions, it pursues to 
further its security of supply by building new electricity transmission lines to Germany in the short-
term and possibly to Sweden in the medium-term. Most of the electricity in the Nordic and the Baltic 
countries is sold in a joint market, Nord Pool. Denmark wants the whole of Europe to increase the 
transmission capacity between countries so that an efficient, truly international electricity market is 
possible. Depending on weather and market conditions, Denmark could, for example, export wind 
power to Europe and import hydropower from Norway and Sweden. 
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4.2.2. Why? To promote domestic cleantech expertise and to take the lead 
The Danish government appears to interpret the surrounding structures of energy policy so that they 
make it possible to strive for an ambitious energy policy – one which allows a rather rapid transition 
to green energy system without excessive costs on the Danish companies and people. Moreover, the 
government seems to view that any other energy policy other than green transition will result in a 
worse outcome. The policymakers also see that transformation of the energy system is a huge 
possibility to further the expertise of an already well-developed and growing cleantech sector which 
accounts increasingly more in total exports of Danish goods – in 2009 its share was 12%. The 
government works on EU and international level to get other countries to adopt similar energy and 
climate measures, but it believes that it can take the lead by showing an example for others. Of course, 
this might be a message they knowingly wish to convey for others, leaving them more leeway to 
demand further actions elsewhere too. Nevertheless, the Danish government’s interpretation is that 
being amongst the frontrunners will result in their benefit. 
 
Resource structure 
Increase the share of renewable energy in production and consumption through expansion of wind 
power is the most appropriate choice for the Danish government because, first of all, their view is 
that they have plentiful wind resources within their borders. With the right technology and shrinking 
costs, the windy conditions can be harnessed for energy purposes on a substantially larger scale that 
is currently being done. The Danish sea areas offer massive possibilities to expand wind power 
capacity. On land, the situation is different, for it is difficult to build new large wind farms in a densely 
populated country which is rather small in size. The resource base for solar and wave power is 
interpreted as suitable as well, but technological and economic reasons set limits for their use. 
Denmark has a large agricultural sector which seemingly offers good potential for biogas production 
but since the farmlands are already in intense use, the government remains sceptical whether biomass 
and second-generation biofuels can be produced domestically in such amounts that can cover the 
needs of different energy sectors, especially transport. Therefore, the government opts for the 
electrification of the energy system, including transport, because the potential to produce electricity 
is deemed greater than the potential of bioeconomy. 
 
In the long term, much of the transition to fossil fuel independence in the transport sector will 
probably have to be based on more electric power.268 
 
                                                 
268 Danish Government 2011a, 38. 
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Electrification is an efficiency improvement too, and although the resource structure isn’t the only 
one which seems to direct Danish policy choices in favour of energy efficiency, the environment and 
the economy also affect this, the finite or volatile resources need to be utilised efficiently. The oil and 
gas resources in Denmark are shrinking but there are remarkable volumes left which will grant the 
government revenues for years to come. However, if Denmark holds on to its energy and climate 
targets in the future, the utilisation of these resources will come to an end by 2050 at latest. 
 
Economic structure 
An important part of allowing the expansion of wind power is the Danish government’s interpretation 
that the cost of especially onshore wind power is very near to become fully competitive with other 
forms of energy production, most of all with Norwegian and Swedish hydropower. Offshore wind 
power will still require subsidies and other sorts of preferential treatment, but the government views 
that through research, development, demonstration, and innovation the costs will decrease. The same 
will eventually happen with solar power, although later. Biomass, like wind power, is regarded as on 
the verge of being mature for markets with low costs. Then again, the Danish government’s vision 
was at the time of publication of the documents that fossil fuels will become increasingly scarce, 
concentrated on the hands of few unstable regimes, and thus all the more expensive. As the world has 
evidenced, the massive expansion of the unconventional oil and gas production specifically in the 
United States has led to radical price decreases – a barrel of Brent crude oil cost US$ 114 on 20th June 
2014 but less than a fourth of that, only US$ 27, on 21st January 2016 (since then the price has been 
increasing).269 Nuclear energy is not part of Danish energy planning, partly because the government 
remains doubtful about the price of it. It recognises that theoretically it provides relatively cheap 
electricity, but it alleviates that in practice many power plants have significantly exceeded budgets 
and required subsidies of various kinds.  The government stresses that the green energy transition will 
unavoidably come at a cost, but it strives to conduct it as little expenses as possible. The assumed 
cost of conversion to renewable energy – 0.5% of GDP in 2050 – is assessed as feasible, with the 
Danish economic situation strong enough to take the lead in paving way for green transition. The 
intention is not purely altruistic, for early efforts to fulfil energy and climate commitments will help 
make environmentally sound forms of energy production and consumption cheaper for everyone, 
including Denmark. Furthermore, investments in green technology research and various 
demonstration and deployment projects will benefit domestic cleantech companies, resulting in 
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positive employment effects and thus increasing welfare, even in the short-term. Finally, most 
investments in energy efficiency are deemed cheaper than investments in production capacity. 
 
Institutional structure 
Because of the successful climate negotiations in Paris in last December, the international community 
has a legally binding, worldwide climate agreement. Obviously, this was not the case during the time 
of writing of the Danish energy and climate strategies, but the government seemed to have a lot of 
faith in reaching one. One main element in this process was evaluated to be the example the rich 
industrialised countries can show, and therefore Denmark decided to take the lead as part of, and 
indeed within, the EU in combat against climate change. The government also interprets that the 
benefits of international energy markets and specifically the ever closer cooperation in energy affairs 
in the EU are greater than those achieved in a system where energy policy is strictly under national 
authority. That assessment leads it to advocate for more integrated energy networks in terms of 
capacity and rules. In addition, the government attempts to push the EU for ever stricter energy 
efficiency standards for devices and applications, because it would further assist it in reducing 
demand for energy, thus easing the pressure to build energy production capacity. In the government’s 
view the kind of measures are unavoidably insufficient on national level. The government also 
advocates for notable increase of the CO2 allowance price (through reducing the number of available 
allowances) within the sectors covered in the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) – which 
accounted to slightly over 40% of Danish emissions in 2008 –, because it would make renewable 
sources of energy more attractive in economic terms. Inside the country, the Danish government 
pursues to better recruit local governments to help in green energy transition. This requires 
frameworks for cooperation and incentives to support them. As a demonstration project, the island of 
Samsø will be made free of fossil fuels already in 2030. 
 
Environmental structure 
The Danish government has a clear view that the environment simply cannot bear much more impacts 
caused by the use of energy, of which 80% comes from burning fossil fuels. Cheap access to coal, 
oil, and gas was descriptive for the 20th century, but the government is convinced that already during 
the first half of this century, other means must be developed to cover most of the use of energy for 
people’s purposes. Otherwise, the global average temperature – not to mention other direct 
consequences – will rise too much, and the effects will be too harsh to handle. This view necessitates 
the government to pursue policies which will cut the Danish emissions to the 80–95% target level, 
and moreover, to cover its energy needs solely from renewable sources by 2050. As already 
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mentioned in the resource structure paragraph, electrifying the Danish energy system and energy 
efficiency, in general, is also desirable from the point of view of the environmental structure, for the 
massive production of biomass and other fuels within the bioeconomy might as well be a burden on 
the environment. Therefore, the government insists continuous monitoring of the sustainability of 
bio-based energy sources. At the same time, it wants to count in other kinds of environmental effects 
than only emission reductions. These include fumes, odour, and noise nuisances, effects on water 
quality, and effects on soil. The environmental challenges regarding the safety of nuclear power plants 
and disposal of radioactive waste further affect the Danish government’s choice to keep nuclear 
power out of Danish energy system. 
 
Technology structure 
According to the understanding of the Danish government, wind power and biomass technologies are 
on the verge of being mature for mass markets with low costs. Technologies which already are there 
include, for example, fossil fuels and hydropower. However, offshore wind power is still more 
expensive than the wind power produced on land. As stated earlier, subsidies for wind power, and 
various sorts of biomass, can be phased out, starting already in the short-term. In the government’s 
view, solar power technologies still operate in niche markets meaning that the costs in relation to 
capacity are yet high. Thus the government believes that the knowledge of solar power technologies 
are, more or less sufficient, but there is a need for further preparation and planning of the next phase 
before they can be integrated into the energy system in large scare. Biogas, as regards it taking over 
natural gas, needs similar measures, as well as the so called smart grid technologies. Then again CCS 
and hydrogen technologies are wholly at the development stage, which is why more knowledge, 
analysis, testing, and demonstration is required before even the preparation for niche markets can 
begin. Electrification of the transport system is also estimated to be a long-term project which will 
take time. Thus, emissions from transport most likely will increase at least until 2035. To hasten 
favourable technological advances, the Danish government is investing especially in demonstration 
projects in wind, solar, wave, and biogas technologies. It doesn’t rule out the possibility of CCS 
technologies being part of the Danish energy system in the future, but it is not relying on it and the 
strategies do not cover notes of Denmark investing in this particular technology. Although the 
electrification of the transport system is crucial for Denmark so that it can achieve the long-term 
emission target, it primarily depends on international technology development within this field. With 
regard to nuclear power, the government sees little growth potential for nuclear power technology in 
Denmark, for it would have to be purchased from abroad. 
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4.3. Finland – further technological advances needed 
4.3.1. How? Sufficient domestic capacity from forest-based biomass and nuclear power 
One guiding principle in Finnish energy and climate strategies is that the EU’s (and the international 
community’s) greenhouse gas reduction targets must be in line with the objective of limiting global 
warming to two degrees Celsius. Therefore, Finnish government supported the EU target of reducing 
emissions as much as by 30% in 2020 compared to the 1990 level, if other industrialised countries 
would have undertaken similar emission reductions. The government of the time saw that without 
increasing efforts already in the short-term, the additional measures taken in the medium- and long-
term would have to be even more ambitious. Still the strategies state clearly that Finland is committed 
to the long-term target of 80–95% emission reductions by 2050. 
 
Should the central biomass fuels not remain zero-emission or CCS not be commercialised, the 
80–95% reduction of emissions cannot be reached in practice.270 
 
However, the tone is rather different than in the Danish publications. The Finnish government notes 
that because of 80% of emissions in Finland emerge from energy production and consumption 
(including transport), reaching the target would require an energy system altered to an almost 
emission-free state. At the same time, its view is that achieving the long-term target is not only ‘very 
challenging’ but actually dependent on development in international fields, such as technology and 
various institutions. Especially without the commercialisation of CCS technology and if forest-based 
biomass fuels should not be counted as zero-emission in the future, the government argues that 
reaching the emission target for 2050 is practically impossible, at least in a cost-efficient way. 
 
In the Energy and Climate Roadmap 2050, the government (or more precisely, a parliamentary 
committee consisting of members from all parties represented in the parliament) conducted six 
different scenarios reflecting the Finnish energy system in the short-, medium-, and long-term. These 
included a baseline scenario, which is built on the premises of the 2013 Energy and Climate Strategy 
and trend-like development thereafter; a Base -80% scenario, which adheres to the latter but reduces 
emissions forcibly to the 80%-target level; a Growth scenario, in which the economy of Finland and 
the world grows quickly; a Stagnation scenario, in which the economic development is opposite to 
the Growth; a Save scenario, where the EU implements ambitious energy efficiency goals quickly; 
and a Change scenario, where the energy system is transformed in a hastened timetable. All of these 
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scenarios invest in the increase of renewable energy and the improvement of energy efficiency, but 
in a different way. On the basis of pre-2013 decided measures, the Finnish final energy consumption 
would be 325 TWh in 2020. The 2013 strategy set a target of 310 TWh at a maximum in 2020. 
However, the Finnish government sees that the relative importance of the electricity supply grows in 
primary (and final) energy consumption due to the ongoing electrification of the energy system. 
Therefore, all but one scenario predict a rise in Finnish electricity supply in the short- and medium-
term, and even the remaining one in the long-term. In 2010, the electricity supply was a little below 
90 TWh, and in 2050 it is estimated to be somewhere between 90 and 110 TWh. Finland is part of 
the Nord Pool spot market, just as Denmark, and is promoting the expansion of common European 
electricity market and building more international transmission capacity, but at the same time, it 
strives to increase its self-sufficiency in electricity consumption. However, the government notes that 
since the usage of most power plants within the Nord Pool is based on commercial agreements, it is 
unlikely that Finland will acquire sufficient amount of production capacity with low production costs 
to be able to phase out all imported electricity. The biggest reason for this is the vast – and increasing 
– capacity of hydropower and wind power with low production costs in other Nordic countries. Still, 
to be able to respond to the peak demand of electricity in cold winter months, the government sees it 
is justifiable to set the target for production capacity so that it equates the annual demand of electricity 
in the country, even when some of the capacity would remain idle under market conditions.  
 
The Finnish government pursues to increase its energy production through expansion of renewables, 
especially forest-based biomass, the creation of a proper framework for small-scale energy 
production, and expansion of nuclear power. Other renewable energy sources might have a small or 
relatively significant role in the Finnish energy mix depending on the future development. Finland 
has currently four nuclear power reactors in operation. Construction of the fifth, Olkiluoto-3, has been 
underway since 2005 but because of numerous of delays, the reactor is currently expected to be in 
operation in late 2018.271 The sixth reactor, Hanhikivi-1, should be in commercial operation in 2024. 
Then, for a few years, Finnish nuclear power capacity would be about 5,500 MW, twice the amount 
of today. In 2013 nuclear provided 23.6 TWh of electricity production,272 and the government in 
power in 2014 expected the number to be about 35 TWh in 2020 and slightly above 50 TWh in 2030. 
This will reduce the heavy dependency on imported electricity Finland is experiencing now especially 
during the winter, and, coupled with the expansion of wind power, phase out the use of coal in power 
plants by 2025 (but the newly elected government worded this goal differently in their programme, 
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stating that coal will be gradually phased out in energy production by 2030). However, two of the 
already existing reactors will be shut down in 2027 and 2030, and the other two in 2039 and 2042, 
and thus new power plants have to be opened if the share of nuclear power is to be kept on the peak 
level of mid-2020s. No scenario expects nuclear power production to grow much further than 50 TWh 
per year by 2050. 
 
The central and most cost-efficient way to increase the share of renewable energy in all production 
and consumption modes is to significantly increase the use of forest-based biomass, i.e. mostly 
woodchips and pulpwood. Already in 2010, the Finnish national renewable energy action plan 
demanded that in 2020 the use of woodchips in power and heat production must total to 25 TWh. The 
2013 strategy further added that woodchips will substitute peat in power plants which are equipped 
with multi-fuel boilers. Furthermore, the Roadmap 2050 estimates that the use of forest-based 
biomass in electricity and heat production will double from 15 TWh in 2012 to 29–32 TWh in 2050. 
In addition, wood-based biomass will be used to manufacture liquid biofuels. In 2012, they were not 
applied at all in biofuels but under the Finnish Distribution Obligation Act, the fuel distributors must 
increasingly add biofuels in their supply, and these obligations are tightened steadily so that in 2020 
20% of transport fuels are covered by biofuels. As a result, forest-based biomass will account 7–19 
TWh in 2030 and 21–33 TWh in 2050 in the manufacture of liquid biofuels. The potential of 
agricultural biomass in Finland, e.g. livestock manure and second-generation biofuels, suitable for 
energy uses is estimated to be around 11–21 TWh. The government uses various mechanisms such 
as subsidies, removals of non-economic obstacles, legal obligations, and advocacy for certain 
international rules to promote the use of various forms of biomass – and to remove any hindrances to 
do so. The newly elected government pursues to increase the share of renewable energy in 
consumption to 50% already during the 2020s. 
 
Prior to the 2013 strategy, Finland had set an objective of wind power production amounting to 6 
TWh by 2020. The strategy aims to increase the production to 9 TWh by 2025. The obstacles to 
onshore wind power construction are mostly related to land-use planning, which is why the 
government promotes the establishment of large wind farms instead of small groups of wind turbines. 
However, the government finds the conditions for wind power production weak in many inland areas 
and thus its long-term objective is to promote offshore wind farms. In 2050, depending on the scenario 
in question, wind power production in Finland may be as small as 7 TWh in 2050, or 29 TWh at 
maximum. 
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The production of hydroelectric power cannot significantly be increased in Finland, for much of the 
hydropower potential is already utilised in energy uses. The government’s goal is to increase the 
production to 14 TWh by 2020 (an increase of around 4% from today’s level) and to 15–16 TWh by 
2050. Solar power and solar heat production is tiny in Finland, although the government’s view is 
that southern Finland does not differ very much from northern Germany as regards conditions for 
solar energy production. Finland encourages small-scale solar power production, for example through 
tax exemption, but large production units are still mainly on demonstration phase. The variation of 
possible solar power production in 2050 is wide, between 0.2 and 18 TWh depending on multiple 
factors and policy choices. Until 2030, the government predicts, production is likely to remain 
minimal. The production potential of other technologies, such as solar heat and heat pumps, is even 
more uncertain, but unlike the Danish strategies – which saw that emissions arising from industrial 
processes could be reduced with heat pumps (and thus they are worth pursuing) – the Finnish ones 
do not recognise such potential. In light of the latter, industrial CO2 emissions released when 
manufacturing, say, steel and concrete may be reduced only through CCS technology. 
 
Currently, as well as in the short- and medium-term, the Finnish government sees that peat has an 
important role as a supplementary fuel to biomass in Finnish energy mix. It is also a domestic source 
of energy and thus in a key position regarding security of supply. On the minus side, peat’s 
environmental effects are not limited to the carbon dioxide emissions released in burning of the fuel, 
but altering mires to retrieve peat for energy uses reduces the carbon stocks in mires which release 
even more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Moreover, organic matter and nutrients leaching 
into water bodies in the process harm the aquatic environment and thus the flora and fauna of 
peatlands. Therefore, the government pledges to gradually reduce the use of peat for energy, but it 
wants to make sure that it won’t be replaced by coal (which is usually imported from Poland or 
Russia), and that phasing out peat won’t lead to an unreasonable increase in district heating prices. In 
2010–2013 the annual use of peat for energy amounted to 23 TWh on average. The government aims 
to reduce this by a third by 2025. In the medium-term, the need for peat in heat production will be 
around 11–13 TWh. However, the target of 80% emission reduction necessitates that peat cannot 
have a part of Finnish energy system in the long-term unless the commercialisation of CCS 
technology allows its use. 
 
In contrast to coal, which is to be phased out in energy production mostly by 2025 (and entirely by 
2030), natural gas is seen as an important transition fuel. Natural gas can be used in energy production 
and industry, and as a fuel for cars and ships. Carbon dioxide emissions following from burning the 
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gas are approximately 40% lower than those of coal. Finland and Estonia have agreed on a joint LNG-
terminal (liquefied natural gas) that will reduce both countries’ dependence on Russian gas. The 
government further favours the use of natural gas as it retains the existing pipes which can be used 
for biogas and bio-based synthetic natural gas (bio-SNG). Moreover, manufacturing biofuels requires 
hydrogen that can be produced from natural gas. However, the long-term emission target necessitates 
that natural gas has to be phased out by 2050 from the Finnish energy system if CCS doesn’t become 
commercialised. 
 
The CO2 emissions from transport in Finland accounted to 12 million tonnes in 2012. The EU has set 
a target of 60% reduction for transport sector by 2050, which requires Finland to bring the emissions 
down to 5 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent. In the short- and medium-term the emissions are reduced 
by increasing the share of biofuels, but the government doubts that the entire transport sector – 
including international transport – can be covered by renewables because their need is so large. 
Therefore, to advance security of supply, among other things, the energy needs of transport must be 
reduced. The government aims to do this by advocating stricter efficiency standards in the EU and 
promoting and directing people to other modes of transport than passenger cars. According to its 
estimates, well above 50% of urban travels could be conducted by public transport, walking, or 
bicycling. This, however, requires dense urban regions and zoning policies which, unlike before, do 
not heavily rely on passenger cars. 
 
Overall, there seems to be a little uncertainty about how Finland can at the same time make sure that 
sufficient amount of energy at reasonable prices is available at all times in the future, especially in 
the long-term, and that the energy and climate targets will be reached. As is evident by the above 
paragraphs, the commercialisation of CCS is deemed very desirable, or even necessary, as is the case 
regarding emission reductions of industrial processes. Furthermore, the Finnish government seems to 
be concerned over the possibility that forest-based biomass, or other sorts of biomass as well, won’t 
be regarded as emission-free fuels in the future. Were this to happen and CCS didn’t become mature 
for market, the 80–95% emission reduction target would be practically impossible to achieve. This 
implies that if the Finnish government had to make a choice between securing energy supply and 
reaching energy and climate targets, it would by all means opt for the former. 
4.3.2. Why? Dependency on nuclear power, biomass, and CCS technology 
Despite some similarities with their Danish colleagues’ assessments, the Finnish government sees the 
surrounding structures as more limiting and conditional from the perspective of ambitious green 
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energy policy. In fact, the underlying thought in Finnish strategies appears to be that it is not 
practically possible for Finland to reach the long-term energy and climate targets within the current 
policy environment. Further, and remarkable, technological development is needed, especially in the 
commercialisation of CCS technology which is vital for the state. Furthermore, if scientific evidence 
shows in the future that biomass is not entirely emission-free, and international calculation rules for 
the sustainability of the fuel change as a result, the Finnish government views its means to 
successfully complete green energy transition by 2050 as severely limited. Reaching the targets in 
this worst-case scenario would translate into remarkably higher costs for energy and deteriorated 
security of supply, a price too great for the government to pay. 
 
Resource structure 
As the second most heavily-forested country in the EU,273 Finland has a vast potential for wood-based 
biomass production, amounting to 220,000 square kilometres. According to the strategies, 
afforestation continues and the country’s forests could be used, sustainably, up to twice as much for 
energy and other purposes compared to the current level. This directs the government to view wood-
based biomass and other bioproducts as the single most important sources of renewable energy, and 
further, the most prominent means to achieve energy and climate targets. It also highlights why 
Finland does not share much the Danish concern over the sufficiency of biomass resources. Only the 
energy needs of the transport sector exceed the capacity bioproducts in the long-term. Biomass 
resources originating from agriculture are notable too, and both forestry and agriculture generate a 
lot of waste suitable for energy production, further increasing the Finnish biomass base. There are no 
uranium mines in Finland and very few explorations for the mineral thus leaving the country fully 
dependent on imports for nuclear power, but the government does not seem concerned about it. In 
Finland there is significant potential for wind power production on the sea and coastal areas allowing 
wind power expansion, but in inland the potential is limited. Solar radiation for power and heat 
production is also regarded sufficient, especially for small-scale production, whereas large 
installations are best-suited for buildings which need heating during the summer. Resources for 
hydropower are decent but the government views that they might grow only slightly due to rising 
annual rainfalls caused by global warming. Therefore, energy transition must be completed without 
much further help from hydropower production. Finland imports all the fossil fuel resources 
consumed in the country leaving it no reasons, at least from the perspectives of the resource and the 
environment structures, why not to phase out their use as quickly as possible. Then again, the total 
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area of mires in Finland is massive leaving the country with vast stocks of commercially extractable 
peat.  
 
[t]he utilisation of peat for energy will be reduced systematically due to emissions and other 
environmental damage caused, in such a manner that peat is not replaced by coal.274 
 
It follows that the government wants first to stop using coal for energy purposes, which can be 
replaced by peat, before taking peat out of energy uses. The government fears that striving to phase 
out peat and fossil fuels in tandem could lead to a situation where the former is merely displaced with 
the latter, thus further reducing Finnish self-sufficiency. 
 
Economic structure 
Although wind power production has great potential from the perspective of the resource structure, it 
views that within the economic policy environment wind power is remarkably less promising. The 
feed-in tariff system for onshore wind might be continued also in the medium-term, and the expansion 
of offshore wind would require even more considerable state subsidies. In other words, the 
government does not view wind power as profitable in the near future. There are no mentions about 
the competitiveness of nuclear power in the strategies which implies that the government is confident 
about it. Such seems to be the case with most wood-based bioproducts, and peat too, though the 
former receives preferential treatment. Some bioproducts, like bio-SNG, need also subsidies, for 
currently it is more expensive than natural gas. Just as its Danish counterpart, the Finnish government 
views green energy transition as very beneficial for the cleantech industry, and hence for the whole 
economy in terms of employment and balance of trade, already in the short-term but increasingly so 
in the medium- and long-term. However, reaching the energy and climate targets cost-effectively is 
not possible for Finland without the commercialisation of CCS technology, which arguably explains 
in part why the Danish strategies appear more ambitious than the Finnish ones. The low price of CO2 
emission allowance within the ETS sector threatens the discontinuation of fossil fuels and thus 
expansion of renewables. On the other hand, the government argues that too high prices of fossil fuels 
in the EU only will not just undermine the competitiveness of domestic companies, but might lead to 
carbon leakage which refers to moving (polluting) industries abroad – which does no good for the 
environment but hampers the domestic economy.  
 
Institutional structure 
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Avoiding carbon leakage is crucial in ensuring that climate change is halted to bearable levels, 
according to the Finnish government. Therefore, it insisted on a global climate agreement which 
eventually was realised. The government also required that the global efforts must be in line with 
what is needed to reach the target of limiting the global warming to two degrees Celsius. As for the 
country’s own part, the central role of biomass resources in Finnish energy planning explains why 
the government seems to be worried about the possibility of changes in international emission 
calculations in regards to woodchips and other wood-based biomass. Whether or not wood-based 
resources are emission-free is a scientific debate, but the government tries to avoid any hindrances to 
their use that may follow from such discussion. In the EU, the Finnish government advocates setting 
only one or two binding targets instead of three which were set for 2020. According to it, this would 
leave more room for optimisation of most suitable measures on national level. In the government’s 
view, the emission reduction target would probably yield the highest cost-efficiency whereas the 
renewable energy target would reassure investors and developers of green technology. Binding 
energy efficiency target is not viewed as helpful but the government supports ever higher standards 
for equipment and EU-wide eco-planning and energy labelling as it allows the country to pursue 
efficiency in areas where it is not possible on solely national basis. As the sufficiency of renewable 
resources for the needs of transport is questionable – and since the electrification of the sector is not 
dealt with as much details as in the Danish strategies – the government strives to decrease the energy 
needs in transport. This is done by affecting local governments’ zoning policy regulations and other 
sorts of community development planning so that the need for passenger cars, by far the biggest 
energy consumer sector within transport, would decrease. Easing legal and administrative obstacles 
especially for the expansion of renewable energy, say, wind farms, is also in the toolkit. 
 
Environmental structure 
The Finnish government recognises the scientific evidence which clearly indicates that human-
induced climate change must be limited to the average temperature rise of two degrees Celsius to 
avoid drastic consequences for the natural environment and societies. The fact that northern regions 
warm even more than the globe as a whole further seems to support the government’s involvement 
in ambitious EU energy and climate targets, even setting higher targets nationally (e.g. the share of 
renewables in transport by 2020), and to insist that the burden must be shared with every country. 
However, seemingly this does not determine Finnish energy policy even in the long-term in a sense 
that the government would pursue to reach the energy and climate targets at a very high cost or 
severely compromising security of supply. This suggests that if (wood-based) biomass was 
considered scientifically as a fuel which produces smaller emissions than fossil fuel, but which is not 
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entirely carbon-neutral, Finland would hesitate, to say the least, before giving up on its use and finding 
other means to satisfy its energy needs. In short, the vast forests in the country (the resource base) 
and the expertise and competitive edge in the wood sector (the economic structure) apparently 
outweigh environmental considerations. In the long-term, this does not appear true in regards to peat, 
which has the same benefits but undoubtedly is a more harmful pollutant and has other damaging 
effects on the environment. Then again, the environmental threats of nuclear power are deemed 
manageable, and since it is emission-free, apart from mining the uranium, the Finnish government 
finds backing from the environmental structure to justify the use of nuclear power in all time periods 
covered in this paper. The commercialisation of CCS technology is not viewed necessary only 
because it could significantly reduce emission, but because, if coupled with biomass, it could actually 
withdraw emissions from the atmosphere leading to a decrease in greenhouse gas concentration, 
which would otherwise take a lot of time. 
 
Technology structure 
Apart from some forms of biomass, renewable energy technologies are not mature for mass markets 
in the short-term so that they could compete in price, according to the Finnish government. This 
applies to both onshore and offshore wind power, and at least partially explains why the Finnish wind 
power capacity is not being expanded by 2025 anywhere near the Danish current level. Economic 
and institutional reasons, namely high cost for taxpayers and international market rules, apparently 
limit the possibilities of heavier subsidising. The Finnish government view’s that solar power 
technology will not be able to compete in the mass markets until the long-term, if even then since 
solar power production was remarkable only in two scenarios. However, regarding small-scale 
production, i.e. the consumer’s own use, solar power will become competitive in the medium-term. 
Both technologies are subsidised and given other forms of preferential treatment in the short-term, 
but future subsidies are not guaranteed. There is a great potential for biogas and biofuels production 
from livestock manure and non-food crops but both technologies are deemed to require support and 
the government is still preparing a fully coherent legal and administrative framework to better assist 
them. Although CCS technology is viewed as of vital importance for Finland, there are no mentions 
about CCS-related demonstration projects in Finland and the technology is overall in an early 
development stage. Moreover, the 2050 Roadmap notes that even on an international level, progress 
has not been as fast as estimated before. In short, Finland is almost wholly reliant on technological 
advances made elsewhere. Based on this material, there is a visible paradox between the importance 
the CCS technology is given in Finnish future energy system and the efforts the government is 
preparing to assist the commercialisation of the technology. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have analysed the national energy and climate strategies of Denmark and Finland to 
find answers to questions of how these countries are planning to transform their energy systems in 
the coming years and decades, and why have they chosen exactly the means they are currently 
employing. I have contextualised this study within the spheres of energy and climate change, both 
understood in a wide societal sense. I have applied social structurationist approach to develop a 
theoretical framework which, I argue, covers the most relevant aspects of energy policy.275 
Methodologically this thesis can be defined as a comparative case study which – I further argue – in 
spite of some arising critical notes can provide generalisation to the theoretical framework, and, 
moreover, to some of the empirical findings. In this final section I shall first add a few concluding 
remarks on the discussion of the previous section. Some of the reasons behind the Danish and Finnish 
aim to decarbonise their energy system might not have been covered in the countries’ strategies, and 
hence, in the analysis above. Based on the literature and theoretical framework I have utilised in this 
work, it is now time to raise a few other possible factors which may direct the countries’ energy 
planning although they were not dealt with in their strategies.  Then I will evaluate the theoretical and 
methodological model utilised in this study estimating its suitability for other works, after which I 
shall discuss the accuracy of the hypothesis. Finally, I will point out some key factors which might 
be crucial in defining the content of future energy and climate strategies of Denmark and Finland, or 
any other country. 
 
Overview of the findings 
From the perspective of energy and climate targets, the Danish aims to decarbonise their energy 
system can be judged as more ambitious than the Finnish ones. One inevitable fact that was mentioned 
in both countries’ papers was that reaching the energy and climate targets comes at a cost. Due to 
several years of stagnation and sluggish economic growth prospects in Finland,276 the policymakers 
might just see that the economic structure leaves less leeway for ambitious efforts in comparison to 
Denmark where at least some parts of the energy transition can be funded through sales of oil and 
                                                 
275 Arguably the (rather traditional) notion of using energy as a mean of power politics was almost obsolete in the analysis, 
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find the theoretical framework just as suitable for cases of energy ‘superpowers’ who inextricably bind their energy policy 
with power politics. One way to view this is that the state in question interprets the surrounding structures, specifically 
the resource, institutional, and economic structures as something which enable the practice of using energy as a mean to 
increase the country’s direct influence outside its borders. 
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natural gas. However, it would be misleading and too simplistic to put a lot of weight on the general 
view of the economy. Although it might not be the kind of thing policymakers want to stress in such 
documents as the long-term energy strategies, one would expect to see at least some mentions of the 
stagnating economy, if it really was deemed to notably constrict the country’s efforts. Therefore, I do 
think that the findings made in the analysis do at least partially cover the Danish and Finnish 
interpretations of the energy policy environment. In that light, Danish governments have viewed the 
surrounding structures as more favourable and promising than the Finnish governments have, and 
thus, aspiring measures make more sense for the Danes than the Finns. It also seems that the 
environmental structure with all its implications appears for the Danish governments more as 
something which must not be neglected in favour of, say, the resource and the economic structures, 
and which, perhaps, must even be given the priority in the long-term. It seems that for Finland even 
the long-term environmental considerations may have to be compromised in a sense that the 
greenhouse gas emission target may not be reached – although at the same time the countries’ 
policymakers strongly stress that internationally climate change commitments must be met with the 
scientific evidence of their sufficiency. What could not be traced in this analysis was the effect of 
interest groups and lobbyists on the politicians and government officials who have planned and 
produced the energy strategies. Quite possibly, say, environmental NGOs have had significantly less 
influence on the respective authorities than, for instance, power companies. Conversely, the wind 
industry and the cleantech sector in general might already have grown to such scale in Denmark that 
they have been able to develop a significant lobbying capacity of their own. There is certainly no 
need to underestimate such factors. For instance, in 1993 the Finnish Parliament voted against 
building a fifth nuclear power plant in the country, but nine years later it narrowly voted for the power 
plant. At the time most of the most influential interest groups such as the Central Organisation of 
Finnish Trade Unions, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers, and the Central Union 
of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners were all eagerly supporting building more nuclear 
power.277 They also had an effect on parties which were linked with these groups.278 
 
Wind power 
Denmark and Finland were chosen as the subjects of the study because of the striking difference in 
their wind power capacity. As the analysis shows, this big difference both in capacity and production 
will most likely remain in all time periods. What was rather surprising for me was that in terms of 
resource sufficiency there was not really divergence in interpretations between Denmark and Finland, 
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in line with the two maps in section 1.6 which suggested that there shouldn’t be. Potential for wind 
power was estimated limited only in large parts of Finnish inland areas due to lack of resources (for 
Denmark the potential for further growth was also limited but for land use reasons), but on the coast 
and on the sea it was deemed vast just as in Denmark. Instead, it was the economic competitiveness 
and, to some extent, the maturity of the technology of wind power which divided the countries, and 
rather clearly. Whereas the Danish government in power in 2011 suggested renouncing subsidies for 
onshore wind turbines connected to the grid from 2014 due to their ‘very favourable financial 
perspectives’, the Finnish government’s feed-in tariff for wind power, including onshore, continues 
well into the medium-term. It was also the view of the Finnish government reigning in late 2014, that 
reaching the targets set for offshore wind power production by 2050 would require ‘heavy 
subsidising’ that could contradict with EU competition laws, thus creating doubts about the prospects 
of reaching the targets. 
 
Nuclear power 
The different stance Denmark and Finland take on nuclear power highlights the division that can be 
seen much wider in Europe. Twelve EU states have signed an agreement to promote the role of 
nuclear energy in the energy mix of the EU. In addition to Finland, for instance France and the UK 
are part of this group.279 Then again, Germany has taken similar approach than Denmark, for it has 
pledged to phase out the use of nuclear power by 2023.280 Hence it seems that as long as the nation 
states have full sovereignty to determine their own energy mix nuclear energy will be part of the EU’s 
energy planning. Even if security of supply would partially be subjected to supra-national decision-
making, it would be a long way to install some restrictions to the production of nuclear energy, not 
least because among the countries producing nuclear energy are some of the most influential EU 
member states. In this respect a centralised and common EU energy policy including, among other 
things, all energy production forms seems now an unlikely prospect even for decades to come, for 
nuclear energy alone is dividing the member states into two different camps. However, one must keep 
in mind that although right now there is no specific energy mix which could meet both the energy 
needs of societies and the 21st century environmental standards, technological development can 
change the current situation very quickly. If some technological breakthrough would make a given 
production form preeminent compared to others – the same way the car once became to be the 
dominant transport mode – then countries’ energy mixes, and thus prospects for a common EU energy 
policy, may be redrawn rapidly. 
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Bioproducts and transport 
Regarding the use of biomass in energy production the countries’ viewpoints align with each other. 
Since Finland has significantly larger forest areas the question is understandably more crucial to the 
Finns than the Danes. However, when it comes down to biofuels and biogas in transport, the countries 
have somewhat diverging views. Here it is Finland which is increasing the share of bioproducts in 
more ambitious pace, its resource base and expertise in this sector providing it with a competitive 
edge. Although both countries recognise there is still much uncertain about the long-term composition 
of the transport sector, the Danish government argues that future transport system will probably have 
to be based on electrification – due to lack of resources and efficiency gains –, and therefore, it has 
not got many plans to increase the share of biofuels after the medium-term. Finland recognises that 
to cover the energy needs of transport fully by bioproducts doesn’t appear possible, but they will 
nonetheless have a big role in the system even though parallel solutions have to be developed in 
addition, whether electric or hydrogen vehicles. This question too might divide EU countries and 
other states, moreover, there might be other preferred options for future transport system which didn’t 
emerge in this study. The question is ever more crucial, for in energy affairs decided measures and 
policy choices have very long-lasting effects and building a new infrastructure can be extremely 
costly – once the process is underway it might prove very difficult to change the path. That is why it 
is utterly important to consider carefully all the positive and negative implications of different 
systems. Furthermore, an EU-wide or indeed a truly international transport infrastructure – just like 
an international electrical grid – might have significant benefits in relation to 28 or so national 
systems. This should be held in mind in all policy planning. 
 
Theoretical framework 
As for the theoretical and methodological framework I have utilised in this paper, I would argue that 
it turned out to be decent, and combined with the chosen material, I was able to adequately answer 
the research questions. I remain strongly in favour of social structurationist approach, for it allowed 
me to capture both the limiting and enabling aspects of the policy environment within which states 
operate, but also include states’ own goals and attempts to influence the surrounding structures in the 
analysis. One of the findings, the diverging view Denmark and Finland have on the economic 
feasibility of wind power, further illustrate that the policy environment as such does not determine 
the countries actions, but they have to be interpreted, and these perceptions are hardly independent of 
the governments’ aspirations and targets, not to mention those of lobbyists. I am confident that with 
the approach I used in this study I was able to grasp some central aspects of Danish and Finnish – or 
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any other country’s which is committed to energy and climate targets – energy policy. Only one 
visible paradox arose in the analysis, namely the estimated significance of the carbon capture and 
storage technology for the Finnish energy system and the lack of mentions how to actively promote 
the development, deployment, and, later, commercialisation of the technology. However, if there is a 
problem here, I would say it is somewhere else than in the theoretical framework itself. It can be that 
the material chosen for the study was inadequate in this respect – there might well be other documents 
covering Finnish efforts to support the CCS technology. But just as well, the apparent paradox in the 
analysis could originate from reality, that is, the Finnish energy policy itself may be paradoxical in 
this respect. Taking into account the cost and technological difficulties associated with many 
demonstration projects of CCS, it wouldn’t be too much of a surprise. In 2010 a Finnish state-bound 
company Fortum cancelled its CCS project in a coal power plant in Meri-Pori, Finland, due to 
“company strategy and the outcome of various studies”.281 
 
No doubt a similar approach could be used for studying many other countries’ energy policy too. 
Instead of comparing two or more countries I should think this kind of approach could also be utilised 
to analyse one country’s strategies in different times and hence track in a process-tracing manner how 
its energy planning has developed over the years. This would obviously make the study a single-case 
study, which should be perfectly applicable. Of course, other methodological choices should be 
possible too. The actor does not necessarily have to be a state, but also an energy association, a 
company, or an NGO, to name a few, could well be the subject of the study. In that case, however, 
the theoretical framework, the dimensions of energy policy, might have to be reworked. This could 
mean narrowing the structures to include only the relevant factors which are of the interest of the 
actor, say, a given resource or a few certain technologies. As long as the two principles of case study 
research defined by Robert Yin are met – that a case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
which cannot be explained self-evidently by the context which surrounds it –,282 the research qualifies 
as a case study. 
 
Hypothesis 
Initially, I hypothesised that Denmark and Finland are pursuing security of supply partly through 
similar means, including, for instance, stronger utilisation of biomass and agricultural waste, 
advocacy for stricter energy efficiency standards in the EU and increase of the CO2 allowance price 
within the ETS, and promotion of smart grid technologies. All these assumptions turned out to be 
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accurate, but what I did not expect was that Finland seems to support the development and use of 
various biomass resources in the medium- and long-term more strongly than Denmark, who appears 
to favour the use of electricity (and heat) producing technologies and devices especially in transport, 
and is worried about the sufficiency of biomass resources in the country due to already intense 
farming. The notion that Denmark and Finland pursue security of supply through different means 
proved also true. Denmark is expanding wind power capacity, and hence production, far more than 
Finland, even though the latter aims to significant increases in wind power production in the short-
term. Still, Finland will be far away from the Danish levels. The assumption about nuclear energy 
was also valid, and indeed, its significance for the Finnish energy mix is growing although the peak 
levels are apparently met already in the medium-term. 
 
Due to Finland’s rather low rate of self-sufficiency in energy consumption, one part of my hypothesis 
was that security of supply would be a more stressing matter for Finland than Denmark. The analysis 
shows that this kind of statement is not accurate. All the different aspects (availability of energy, 
competitive prices, and environmental considerations) of security of supply were very much dealt 
with in both Finnish and Danish documents, and based on this material it cannot be evaluated which 
one seems to be more worried or cautious about it. Neither the theoretical framework suggests that 
security of supply would be a more pressing matter for some than others. Only two differing stances 
between the countries were found in this study as regards ‘the importance’ of security of supply. The 
first was about the need to have a big enough domestic electricity production capacity to be able to 
cover the domestic demand of electricity. At the time the Danish strategies were published, Denmark 
was a net-exporter of energy, but it did not seem too worried about the prospect that it would not 
remain so in the long-term. In fact, it was clearly stated that the country is willing to integrate its 
electricity sector with those of other EU countries, and beyond that. Danish governments did not seem 
to think that it was necessary to be fully self-sufficient in such an international market as long as the 
market as a whole had the required capacity. Finland was also a supporter of this development but at 
the same time it wanted to make sure that its own electricity production capacity would be able to 
cover domestic consumption even if there wasn’t need, or under market rules, even a possibility, to 
keep it in full use. The other diverging position was about the prospects of security of supply in an 
energy system undergoing ambitious green transition. Finland saw a couple of big threats – the CCS 
technology remaining on research and development level, and changing emission calculations for 
biomass resources – which could undermine both the long-term energy and climate targets, and 
security of supply. Denmark also recognised that further technological advances are required but it 
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seemed much more confident about the possibility to fit uncompromised security of supply and the 
climate targets together. 
 
Further research 
It would be interesting to analyse Denmark and Finland’s next energy and climate strategy with a 
similar approach to see, how are the countries’ policymakers seeing the energy policy environment 
then – are there any differences compared to these documents written in the first half of this decade, 
and if so, what kind of. In Finland the preparation of the next energy and climate strategy is on the 
way and it should be published later this year. Its content can and should be the subject of some other 
study. As pointed out at the very start of this paper, the significance of constant and affordable energy 
is, if anything, ever greater. For Denmark and Finland, some of the most defining factors of their 
future energy and climate strategies include first of all technological development. The fate of the 
CCS technology is especially crucial. How long will it form one of the cornerstones of Finnish energy 
policy if it faces a setback after another and the commercialisation of the technology is delayed even 
more? 
 
The pricing mechanism of energy production might also become a huge problem to solve. It didn’t 
seem to raise many concerns in the documents covered in this paper but according to a recent study, 
mainly the expansion of wind power specifically in Sweden and Denmark has already cut the annual 
electricity bill of Nordic countries’ customers by 20%, i.e. around 3.5 billion euros, and the prospects 
are that the prices may come down another 8 billion euros by 2020.283 This is substantially shrinking 
the profits of coal power plants, CHP plants, nuclear power plants, and even hydropower which likely 
will end up in shutting down a great number of them. In an environmental sense wind power is thus 
doing just what it was supposed to, but due to the volatility of it and – at least now – the lack of 
sufficient storage technologies, this is a threat to security of supply. Therefore, there is a ‘new’ 
problem at hand of how to guarantee the economic feasibility of power plants which are at least now 
needed to level up the volatile wind power production. The shrinking electricity prices, if the 
abovementioned scenario is realised, will likely put the expansion of nuclear energy in Finland under 
doubt. 
 
The next a few years or so could also offer some answers of future transport system – whether it is 
going to be based on biofuels, electricity, or something else such as hydrogen, probably granting both 
                                                 
283 Liski and Vehviläinen 2015. 
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Denmark and Finland more tools, which at the time of publishing the documents dealt with in this 
thesis appeared somewhat limited. On the positive side, now that the world has a global, and legally 
binding, climate agreement, we could expect to see increased efforts from the states to combat climate 
change. At the end of the day, although there remain several key questions regarding green energy 
transition, this shouldn’t lead to desperation, and I think the analysis in this study echoes that 
statement. But solving these problems will determine not only the structure of our future energy 
systems, but also much of the dynamics of international community and, ultimately, the life prospects 
of current and upcoming generations of people. 
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